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Abstract

This research used systems architecture to develop a model that determined the effect of
Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) on mission success rates for unmanned
aerial systems (UAS). To evaluate this effect, a simulation model was developed and
used to analyze the difference between mission success rates for a theoretical UAS with
and without ISHM. Design of Experiments analysis techniques were used to map a
response surface that modeled the difference between mission success rates calculated for
current health management technology and ISHM. Using representative data for a UAS,
the analysis determined that the failure distribution parameters, sensor quality (which
determines the relationship between probability of detection and probability of false
alarm), and probability of an imminent fault during a mission were significant to the
model. The result of the model determined that ISHM can result in a significant
improvement on mission assurance, especially when implemented with higher quality
sensors and on vehicles where the probability of imminent failure is higher relative to the
mission times and time between preventative maintenance. This appears consistent with
the premise that ISHM can support an extension of preventative maintenance intervals
with an attendant reduction in sustainment cost.

iv

Dedicated to my loving and patient husband, I could never have finished this without
you! To my mother, who read endless drafts of this paper, thank you for assisting me
through every challenge I throw myself into. And finally, to my son, thank you for being
the light at the end of the tunnel.

v

Acknowledgments
I would like to express my deepest appreciation for my research advisor, Dr. David
Jacques, for all of his guidance and assistance during this effort. I would also like to
thank my committee members, Dr. Michael Grimaila and Dr. John Colombi, for their
endless support and feedback throughout the course of this research endeavor. Finally, I
would to thank the ISHM Subject Matter Expert team from AFRL/RQ of Mr. Scott Burns
and Mr. Mark Derriso for their unparalleled knowledge, insight, and assistance. The
support I have received from all of these individuals has been above and beyond and I am
sincerely grateful.

Sarah E. Storm

vi

Table of Contents
Page
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv
Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. vii
List of Figures ......................................................................................................................x
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... xi
I. Introduction .....................................................................................................................1
1.1 Background ...............................................................................................................1
1.2 Problem Statement ....................................................................................................2
1.3 Research Objectives and Hypothesis ........................................................................3
1.4 Methodology .............................................................................................................5
1.5 Assumptions and Limitations....................................................................................5
1.6 Implications ...............................................................................................................6
1.7 Preview......................................................................................................................7
II. Literature Review ............................................................................................................8
2.1 Chapter Overview .....................................................................................................8
2.2 Background ...............................................................................................................8
2.2.1 Current State of UAS Health Management ...................................................... 8
2.2.2 Taxonomy......................................................................................................... 9
2.3 Notional ISHM Configuration ................................................................................12
2.4 Expected Benefits and Applicable Metrics .............................................................15
2.4.1 Effect on Scheduled and Unscheduled Maintenance ..................................... 15
2.4.2 Decreased Mean Time to Repair .................................................................... 17
2.4.3 Operational Availability Improvement .......................................................... 18
2.4.4 Increased Mission Success ............................................................................. 19
2.4.5 Cost Savings ................................................................................................... 20
2.5 Analytic Models ......................................................................................................21
2.6 Analytic Architecture ..............................................................................................26
2.7 Design of Experiments ............................................................................................28
2.8 Literature Review Summary ...................................................................................31
III. Methodology ................................................................................................................33
3.1 Overview .................................................................................................................33
3.2 Design ISHM Concept of Operations .....................................................................33
3.3 Identify Measures of Effectiveness .........................................................................34
vii

Page
3.4 Identify and Develop Architecture Views...............................................................36
3.5 Develop Analytic Modeling and Simulation...........................................................38
3.6 Evaluate Model .......................................................................................................40
3.7 Summary .................................................................................................................42
IV. Analysis and Results ....................................................................................................43
4.1 Chapter Overview ...................................................................................................43
4.2 ISHM Architecture ..................................................................................................43
4.2.1 Integrated Systems Health Management Concept of Operations ................... 43
4.2.2 OV-5b Operational Activity Models .............................................................. 50
4.2.3 OV-6a Rules Model ....................................................................................... 57
4.2.4 SV-1 Systems Interface Model ...................................................................... 58
4.3 ISHM Analytic Model.............................................................................................61
4.4 Model Analysis .......................................................................................................65
4.4.1 Design of Experiments Test Design ............................................................... 66
4.4.2 Design of Experiments Results and Conclusions ........................................... 70
4.5 Summary .................................................................................................................74
V. Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................................75
5.1 Chapter Overview ...................................................................................................75
5.2 Research Questions Answered ................................................................................75
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research ..................................................................87
5.4 Summary .................................................................................................................88
Appendix A: Architecture-Based Evaluation Process (ABEP) .........................................90
Appendix B: ISHM Architecture .......................................................................................92
B.1 Integrated System Health Management Concept of Operations ............................92
B.2 Architecture Concept of Operations .....................................................................101
B.3 AV-1 .....................................................................................................................104
B.4 OV-1 .....................................................................................................................108
B.5 OV-2 .....................................................................................................................109
B.6 OV-5a ...................................................................................................................110
B.7 OV-5b ...................................................................................................................111
B.8 OV-6a ...................................................................................................................114
B.9 SV-1 ......................................................................................................................115
Appendix C: Analytic Model Code .................................................................................116
Appendix D: Design of Experiments Results and Models ..............................................131
viii

Page
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................140

ix

List of Figures
Page
Figure 1 - Future ISHM Capabilities [Derriso, 2011]......................................................... 6
Figure 2 - Component Life: 100% Healthy to 100% Failed [Atlas, 2001] ....................... 12
Figure 3 - Typical ISHM configuration [Benedettini, 2009] ...................................... 14, 76
Figure 4 - The ISHM SA&O Quantification Process Map [Datta, 2004] ........................ 23
Figure 5 - Example Two-Tier Formulation of an ISHM Design Problem for a Reusable
Launch Vehicle (RLV) [Mehr, 2005] ............................................................................... 24
Figure 6 - Multi-Disciplinary Form of a Multi-Objective Optimization Problem [Mehr,
2005] ................................................................................................................................. 25
Figure 7 - OV-5b "Nominal Mission Operations" ............................................................ 52
Figure 8 - OV-5b "Fault During Mission” ........................................................................ 54
Figure 9 - OV-5b "Lifetime Operations" .......................................................................... 56
Figure 10 - OV-6a "Rules Model" .................................................................................... 58
Figure 11 - SV-1 "Systems Interface Model" ................................................................... 60
Figure 12 - Family of ROC Curves................................................................................... 68
Figure 13 - Effect Tests on Significant Factors and Interactions...................................... 71
Figure 14 - Response Surface for Analytic Model ........................................................... 72
Figure 15 - Contour Plots for Response Surface .............................................................. 83
Figure 16 - OV-2 “Operational Node Connectivity Description” .................................... 85

x

List of Tables
Page
Table 1 - Class A Mishap Rates per 100,000 Flight Hours [AF Safety Center, 2012]....... 2
Table 2 - Causes of [UAS] Mishaps [OUSDATL, 2004] ................................................... 2
Table 3 - ISHM SA&O Process Metrics [Datta, 2004] .................................................... 22
Table 4 - Fault Categories ................................................................................................. 36
Table 5 - Planned Architecture Views .............................................................................. 38
Table 6 - ISHM Analytic Model Parameters .................................................................... 40
Table 7 - Representative UAS Data .................................................................................. 41
Table 8 - Confusion Matrix............................................................................................... 63
Table 9 - Mission Success and Maintenance Rates Formulas .......................................... 64
Table 10 - Model Input ..................................................................................................... 66
Table 11 - DOE Factor Levels .......................................................................................... 69

xi

EVALUATING THE EFFECT OF INTEGRATED SYSTEM HEALTH
MANAGEMENT ON MISSION EFFECTIVENESS
I. Introduction

1.1 Background
In 2010, the United States Air Force (USAF) released the results of a year-long study
highlighting the need for increasing autonomy in modern weapon systems, especially in
the domain of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The study identified the need for greater
system autonomy as the “single greatest theme” for future USAF Science and
Technology investments [Dahm, 2010]. Current technology advancements have brought
the USAF to a state of flexible autonomy, which involves dynamically shifting command
and control (C2) from autonomous to operator based on workload, system health, and the
perceived intent of the operator.

One of the key attributes sustaining flexible autonomy is the ability of the UAS to selfdetect, isolate, and diagnose system health problems. Current flight avionics architectures
may include lower level sub-system health monitoring or may isolate health monitoring
functions to a black box configuration, but a vehicle-wide health monitoring information
system has seldom been implemented. A new area of research, Integrated System Health
Management (ISHM), adds a centralized health management system that is responsible
for collecting and processing vehicle health status information from across the vehicle
during all mission phases. ISHM balances data flow from multiple sub-systems and
produces the information necessary to identify current vehicle capabilities, provide
1

situational awareness to mission and ground operations, and quickly identify
contingencies for improved vehicle control and mission decisions.

1.2 Problem Statement
Although reliability has improved since the last official UAS reliability study, the
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Reliability Study commissioned by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense in 2003, significant problems still plague the overall health of the systems.
Current statistics on the loss rate per 100,000 flight hours of several unmanned systems
are compared with various manned military aircraft in Table 1. The UAS loss rates are
magnitudes above the manned aircraft, although some UAS platforms have not yet
reached 100,000 lifetime flight hours.
Table 1 - Class A Mishap Rates per 100,000 Flight Hours [AF Safety Center, 2012]

Mishap Rate Per
100K Hours
Predator
7.69
Global Hawk*
11.37
Reaper
6.37
* Has not reached 100k flight hours
UAS

Manned
Aircraft
F-16
B-52
C-5
C-130

Mishap Rate Per
100K Hours
3.58
1.29
1.04
0.83

The dominant causes of these UAS mishaps are presented in Table 2.
Table 2 - Causes of [UAS] Mishaps [OUSDATL, 2004]

[UAS] Mishap Cause
Power and Propulsion
Flight Controls
Human Error
Communications
Miscellaneous

Percent
37%
25%
17%
11%
10%

The two mishap causes where there can be an assumption made that the current health
management or monitoring system did not adequately detect an imminent failure are
2

Power and Propulsion and Flight Controls, which amount to 62% of total mishap causes.
Granted, even a theoretically ideal health management system cannot account for every
fault or failure cause, but vast improvements need to be made in fault detection systems.

There is also cause for concern on the maintenance side of health management. Even
when a fault is detected pervasive “Could Not Duplicate” (CND) and “No Defect Found”
(NDF) maintenance results show that improvement in fault isolation is needed. In 1999,
an average of nine CND and 47 NDF maintenance results were recorded per aircraft
[Stoll, 2000].

ISHM may be one answer to these health management problems, both on the aircraft and
in the maintenance and logistics side of operations. Previous research efforts have
focused solely on quantifying the cost or performance benefits provided by ISHM, but
few have looked into the effect of ISHM on operational effectiveness. This research
effort intends to give decision makers a better understanding of the advantages and
disadvantages of ISHM by adding the mission environment to previously built cost and
performance analyses.

1.3 Research Objectives and Hypothesis
The focus of this research is to quantify the mission-related benefits of ISHM by
constructing architecture for analysis to compare against current autonomous vehicle
capabilities, and to provide a general baseline model that can be implemented over any
current or future autonomous vehicle. The architecture will include the ability to analyze
3

the causal relationship of ISHM performance metrics (to include the performance of the
necessary algorithms, and the performance and reliability of the monitoring sensors) to
mission performance. The research presented in this thesis is aimed at primarily
answering the following questions using the architecture in a modeling and simulation
context:
(1) What are the potential impacts to ground control stations and users?
(2) What are the potential impacts on current maintenance practices?
(3) What are the performance characteristics necessary for ISHM to effect
mission success?

In order to answer these research questions and develop an appropriate model, a literature
review should first be conducted to answer these questions:
(1) What is the current status of UAS health management?
(2) What are the essential elements of ISHM?
(3) What are the expected benefits of ISHM?

The architecture should also contribute to answering these secondary questions:
(1) How should ISHM data be presented to be effective? How will the
presentation change in regards to the different users of ISHM (operators,
maintenance, etc.)?
(2) Is ISHM cost effective?

4

1.4 Methodology
The development of the analytic architecture simulating ISHM over the lifetime of the
UAS will follow the eight-step Architecture Based Evaluation Process and be in
accordance with the Department of Defense Architecture Framework [DoD, 2012]. This
process was developed by a group of AFIT graduate students in 2006 to bridge the gap
between the system engineering architecture community and the modeling and simulation
community [Dietrichs, 2006]. The analytic architecture will model expected mission
success rates and maintenance actions for a UAS, both with and without ISHM for
statistical comparison.

1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
In order to make a general baseline model, it is not possible to represent every possible
aspect of ISHM; therefore, there are several limitations to this research:
(1) This architecture does not analyze ISHM past the system level; however, the
architecture can be easily modified to include components and subsystems
that are of value to the researcher.
(2) At this point in ISHM development, the ISHM system has no command or
control over the autonomous vehicle. ISHM in its current technology state
only provides recommended actions based on the type of fault it detects. The
vehicle’s autonomous management system will prioritize actions as
necessary or, if there is time, a ground-based ISHM team can overrule or
direct mitigation actions as necessary.

5

1.6 Implications
An ideal ISHM would have several major benefits over current maintenance and tasking
practices. By having a real-time autonomous capability to detect, isolate, and diagnose
problems, the largest direct benefits include a reduction in maintenance time, a larger
operational flight envelope, and the ability to enable e collaborative mission re-planning
based on current system capability and health. Overall, ISHM would improve mission
decision making, enable condition-based maintenance and provide remaining life
quantification while reducing current conservative design life margins and/or inspection
intervals. Planned Near Term, Mid Term, and Far Term future capabilities of ISHM are
illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1 - Future ISHM Capabilities [Derriso, 2011]

6

1.7 Preview
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The introductory chapter discusses ISHM
considerations in terms of technical standards and through the system architectural
definition. The remaining chapters are as follows:


Chapter II examines and classifies the current state of health management
for unmanned aerial systems, provides an ISHM system taxonomy, and
summarizes the major areas of research currently being performed.



Chapter III describes the research methodology and introduces the
architectural development process used to conduct the research.



Chapter IV presents a proposed prototypical ISHM architecture and
provides analysis of the analytic architecture.



Chapter V draws conclusions regarding research objectives, answers the
investigative questions and proposes future research.

7

II. Literature Review

2.1 Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the state of health management for
unmanned aerial systems (UAS), provide an ISHM system taxonomy, and summarize the
major areas of research currently being performed. The first section discusses current
health management practices and describes key terminology. The second section provides
a description of a typical ISHM system as described by literature and the third section
lists expected benefits and applicable metrics of ISHM. The fourth section describes the
main modeling approaches for analyzing the performance or cost-benefit tradeoffs of
ISHM systems. The fifth section gives an overview of current analytic architectures. The
last section summarizes the information provided.

2.2 Background
In order to quantify the effects of ISHM on a system, the current health management
practices must be investigated for comparison; this section discusses current health
management practices and describes key terminology.

2.2.1 Current State of UAS Health Management
The Air Force UAS programs currently use independent sensors incorporated into the
vehicle’s hardware to monitor for fault indicators on critical subsystems. The sensor data
is continuously transmitted to ground operations where it is processed. If the data
8

indicates a fault has occurred the ground operator executes pre-determined mitigation
steps, dependent on which sensor indicated a fault, and sends a message to maintenance.
Once the vehicle lands, maintenance personnel perform diagnostic tests to confirm the
location and identify the type of fault, and then perform maintenance actions to restore
the component. This is less a health management system than a health monitoring system,
in terms of nomenclature. The algorithms used for these systems generally only indicate
an off-nominal condition; they do not give any other information typical of a health
management system.

2.2.2 Taxonomy
Understanding the ISHM system and the benefits it offers depends greatly on
understanding several key terms: failures, errors, faults, novel events, fault detection,
fault isolation, diagnostics, and prognostics.

Failure is defined as a “deviation in behavior between the system and its requirements.
Since the system does not maintain a copy of its requirements, a failure is not observable
by the system” [Buede, 2000].

Error is defined as “a subset of the system state, which may lead to failure. The system
can monitor its own state, so errors are observable in principle. Failures are inferred when
errors are observed. Since a system is usually not able to monitor its entire state
continuously, not all errors are observable. As a result, not all failures are going to be
detected (inferred)” [Buede, 2000].
9

A fault is a known “defect in the system that can cause an error. Faults can be permanent
(e.g., a failure of system component that requires replacement) or temporary due to either
an internal malfunction or external transient. Temporary faults may not cause a
sufficiently noticeable error or may cause a permanent fault in addition to a temporary
error” [Buede, 2000].

A novel event is another type of anomaly in the same class as a fault. The difference is
that a fault is a known defect, where novel events are unknown. Prognostic algorithms are
designed to respond to known events (faults), not novel events [Atlas, 2001].

Degradation involves a declining performance measure that changes with time,
particularly to a lower condition, quality, or level. Generally, systems will continue to
operate in a degraded mode, but not at a specified operating level. Whether the
degradation has advanced to a fault or failure state will be determined as part of the
reliability specification [Ebeling, 2010].

Fault detection is the “determination that the performance of a system or subsystem does
not correspond to its expected behavior. In more general terms, it is determining that a
failure has occurred” [Ross, 1999].

Fault isolation is the “determination of the specific cause of failure so corrective action
can be taken… Ideally, systems are partitioned such that measurable functions can be
implemented on the lowest repairable assembly” [Ross, 1999].
10

Diagnostics can be described as “the process of locating [a] fault at the level in which
restoration may be accomplished” [Ebeling, 2010]. The process includes the utilization of
monitoring hardware and/or software to detect and isolate faults in a given system [Clutz,
2003]. In some expanded definitions, diagnostics can even include determination of a
failure cause [Cardona, 1999]. For the purpose of this thesis, diagnostics will be defined
as “the utilization of monitoring hardware and/or software to determine the failure cause
by detecting and isolating faults.”

Prognostics is defined as an assessment of likely future health (educated prediction) of a
piece of equipment, based on current information [Cardona, 1999]. Prognostics builds on
current diagnostic capabilities using automated procedures to calculate the Estimated
Time to Failure of a system or component. A prognostics system is often associated with
condition-based maintenance, since the results of a prognostic analysis indicates required
maintenance actions, either real-time or predicted [Clutz, 2003].

All these definitions are brought together in Figure 2, which shows a typical component
health trajectory. Diagnostics tells “what” fault curve the component is on and
prognostics determines “where” on the overall health curve the component currently
resides.
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Figure 2 - Component Life: 100% Healthy to 100% Failed [Atlas, 2001]

2.3 Notional ISHM Configuration
An ISHM system is envisioned to serve two primary goals: to monitor the “functional
health” of the system real-time; and to facilitate the maintenance and availability of the
system by diagnosing the physical break-downs in the system that can be replaced offline. These two goals are further explained below:
1. Real-time monitoring of the functional health of the system: ISHM must
constantly monitor the functional health of the system to detect and isolate
faults. From this standpoint, the system is regarded as a ‘collection of
functional units’ (rather than physical units) that must perform flawlessly to
constitute the overall function(s) of the mission. Depending on the level of
autonomy, criticality, and authority, ISHM could either make ‘real-time’
decisions to reroute flows of information, energy, or material from the failed
12

unit to ensure continuous operability, or send appropriate information to a
human-in-the-loop for decision making. The information ISHM provides to the
decision maker should have integrity and be relayed within enough time to
facilitate a good outcome.
2. Determining the physical health of the system: To help maintain the physical
health of the system, ISHM must be able to determine which physical
component has failed or is going to fail and the effect of the failed component
on the system’s capabilities. By continuously monitoring physical units, the
information collected from ISHM should also be used to identify long-term
degradation effects that could cause failures [Mehr, 2005].
Using these goals, this section describes a notional ISHM configuration.

A typical ISHM system consists of sensors placed at critical components within
subsystems of the vehicle that stream data to a management system. The management
system processes the sensor data, executes diagnostic and prognostic algorithms, and then
feeds this information through a reasoner, as seen in Figure 3. This management system
can either be on-board the vehicle in a hardware configuration or off-board enabling the
ground command and control (C2) element.

13

Management System
On-Board C2

Figure 3 - Typical ISHM configuration [Benedettini, 2009]

Sensors can be conventional, measuring temperature, speed, and flow rate, or specifically
tailored to health management applications, such as strain gauges, ultrasonic sensors, or
proximity devices. The sensor data is then processed to remove any artifacts or noises
and manipulated to extract fault features. The diagnostic module then analyzes the fault
features to detect, identify, and isolate developing failure conditions. The diagnostic
information will be combined with historical data in the prognostic module to generate an
estimation of failure times. Algorithms developed for the diagnostic and prognostic
modules are generally based on mathematical models (e.g., Hamilton dynamic,
Lagrangian dynamic, approximation methods), or pattern recognition (e.g., fuzzy-logic,
statistical/regression methods, neural network clustering). Finally, the diagnostic and
prognostic information is turned over to the reasoner module which analyzes available
resources, decides which hazard mitigation steps to execute, and then passes the selected
decision to the on-board C2 module and relays appropriate information to the ground C2
operator and maintenance element [Benedettini, 2009].
14

2.4 Expected Benefits and Applicable Metrics
The overall desired effect of an ISHM system would be to continuously monitor the
system, detect and isolate either a real-time fault or pre-cursers to a fault, determine the
criticality of the fault, and then relay appropriate information to ground control, the onboard C2 module, and maintenance for action. Benefits of this capability are discussed in
the remaining sub-sections.

2.4.1 Effect on Scheduled and Unscheduled Maintenance
The Air Force goal for prognostic systems such as ISHM is to completely eliminate
traditional aircraft inspection and repair patterns [Ross, 1999]. Currently, a
malfunctioning unit is either identified in-flight (based off an alert from an individual
sensor) or identified through scheduled inspections. There is an inherent probability of a
false alarm and a probability of fault detection, meaning that the aircraft could be
incorrectly pulled from an on-going mission or could continue on a mission with an
unknown fault that could lead to system failure. The integrated aspect of ISHM proposes
to severely reduce the false alarm rate and increase the total probability of detection, as
understanding the full health status of the vehicle can identify false positives and identify
if a fault or failure has occurred down-stream. For example: a sensor falsely identifies a
valve stuck closed, a sensor further down the stream indicates a normal flow rate and the
system has not lost any performance aspects; ISHM would therefore not report this as a
system fault, but as a sensor fault.

15

With the continuous monitoring provided by ISHM, pre-cursors to faults can also be
identified and Estimated Time to Failures of the component or total system will be
reported. Additionally, if multiple mission data is stored, every time a fault occurs, the
data collected by ISHM can be used to identify new indicators or pre-cursors to a failure
to be uploaded into the diagnostic and prognostic algorithms.

The overall result is that with ISHM implemented, the probability of unscheduled
maintenance, currently inflated due to prevalent “Could Not Duplicate” and “No Defect
Found” maintenance results, should decrease as unscheduled maintenance should become
more fault driven. Scheduled maintenance intervals can also be investigated for potential
relaxation or removal; current intervals may be conservatively small to counteract the
current lack of health awareness. Ideally with ISHM, the aircraft would replace timebased or event-driven maintenance with a condition-based maintenance system, where
maintenance is only performed based on objective evidence of actual or predictable
failure of a system or its components [OSAIDD, 1999].

Metrics (unless stated otherwise, all formulas in this Chapter are from An Introduction to
Reliability and Maintainability Engineering by Charles Ebeling, 2010):

Tpm – Mean Time between Performances of Preventative (Scheduled) Maintenance

16

MTBM – Mean Time between Maintenance (includes both scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance). The equation for MTBM is shown in Equation 1.
(1)

where

= system design or (economic) life
= expected number of failures in the interval (0,

)

RU - Rate of Unscheduled Maintenance. The equation for RU is shown in Equation 2.
(2)
where

= expected number of failures in the interval (0,

)

MDT – Mean Downtime. The equation for MDT is shown in Equation 3.

(3)

where

= Mean Time to Repair
= mean preventative maintenance time

PD - Probability of Detection
(4)
PFA - Probability of False Alarm
(5)
2.4.2 Decreased Mean Time to Repair
Current fault detection is limited to identifying the occurrence of a fault and an
approximate location, meaning that fault isolation can only occur after the aircraft has
landed. There is also a non-unity probability that the mechanic can even correctly identify
the failure mode once it lands. With ISHM, both fault detection and isolation are
17

performed in-flight, within a specified confidence level, and the appropriate information
is relayed to the maintenance element. This gives the maintenance element time to preposition the necessary maintenance equipment and personnel or order any necessary
replacement parts, severely reducing the total Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) after an
event.

As a result of its continuous monitoring, ISHM would also reduce maintenance time
during scheduled inspections. Prognostics would, theoretically, calculate an Estimated
Time to Failure (ETF) for each component, resulting in each inspection only focusing on
those systems that had passed an ETF threshold in that time interval. Knowing that the
specific systems to be inspected ahead of time would again allow the maintenance
element time to pre-position the necessary maintenance equipment and personnel or order
any necessary replacement parts. ISHM would also negate the current use of timeintensive Built-in Test (BIT) units, as each system would be continuously tested.

2.4.3 Operational Availability Improvement
Based on the decreased downtime in unscheduled maintenance and scheduled
maintenance from ISHM, the Operational Availability for each aircraft should improve.
Another factor affecting Operational Availability is mission turn-around time, or the time
from when the aircraft lands to when it is ready for the next mission. Without ISHM,
mission turn-around time can include lengthy BIT tests to check for failures. Since these
tests are not needed with continuous monitoring and a higher confidence in fault
detection, the mission turn-around time should decrease, increasing Operational
18

Availability. Whether measured in maintenance downtime or a reduction in hours
required for testing and diagnostics, etc., the net result is that a system with ISHM will be
available for use more of the time.

Metrics:
AO - Operational Availability. The equation for AO is shown in Equation 6.
(6)

2.4.4 Increased Mission Success
Having situational awareness of the entire health state of the vehicle assists ground
operations in providing full mission coverage. If a UAS autonomously detects a fault and
due to the fault criticality (for example, low fuel levels) decides to re-task to a closer
trajectory, ground operations can re-task other UAS vehicles to ensure coverage of the
priority targets. Without ISHM, a fault alert would generally give no indication of the
remaining performance capability of the UAS, leaving ground operations to
conservatively scrap that particular mission set.

An additional aspect of increased situational awareness is its affect on UAS flight limits.
Modern autonomous flight control systems limit the vehicle to safe operating loads and
environments; this operating envelope is pre-defined and conservative. With ISHM, the
flight envelope can theoretically be expanded and defined by the design criteria for the
vehicle. Health data would then be used to restrict the envelope to a prescribed level in
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the event of a detected fault. This would increase the operational capability of the vehicle,
allowing for larger mission sets. Improved situational awareness combined with the
theoretical improved Operational Availability would greatly improve the rate of mission
success.

Metrics:
RMS - Rate of Successful Completed Missions. The equation for RMS is shown in
Equation 7.
(7)

2.4.5 Cost Savings
The previous benefits all have some measure of cost savings attached to them. Having a
lower total maintenance downtime, due to decreases in scheduled maintenance and a
lower probability of unscheduled maintenance, leads to a lower personnel cost and even
an option of having less maintenance personnel needed. Fewer maintenance actions also
indicate a potential reduction in spares and supply costs. However, there is an inherent
cost in implementing ISHM, not just to the vehicle but to the resulting operational
infrastructure. The cost savings must be weighed against the implementation costs to
truly investigate the financial aspect of ISHM.

Cost avoidance measures could also be applied as a benefit of ISHM. ISHM identifies
components or subsystems that are near failure, replacing or repairing these parts before
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they fail and cause damage to other parts would avoid the cost of repairing the additional
damage. The upfront cost may be higher in the short run, but the final life cycle cost
would be lower.

2.5 Analytic Models
The majority of analytic models for ISHM have been created by NASA at Ames
Research Center. On-going research is aimed at developing a robust methodology that
can evaluate different ISHM architectures to optimize a set of pre-determined metrics.
This process, known as ISHM Systems Analysis and Optimization (SA&O), consists of a
set of models that can be easily customized for a specific system. Using this SA&O
process offers two immediate advantages:


The effects of ISHM on the overall safety, maintainability, and performance of
the system can be calculated.



During design, engineers can use the process to find the ‘optimal ISHM
architecture’ for that specific system [Mehr, 2005].

The original quantification process identified 24 metrics, listed in Table 3, to be used
across four domains: Design for Testability (DFT) Model, Loss of Mission (LOM)
Model, Turnaround Model, and Maintenance Model.
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Table 3 - ISHM SA&O Process Metrics [Datta, 2004]

1. Loss of Mission
2. Loss of Vehicle
3. Loss of Crew
4. Launch Availability
5. Development Cost
6. Production Cost
7. Annual Operational Cost
8. $/lb (Mission Price/lb)
9. Inherent [ISHM] Reliability
10. Subsystem Reliability
11. Subsystem Failure
Probability
12. [UAS]/Subsystem Mean
Time To Repair

13. [UAS]/Subsystem Mean Time
Between Failure
14. Subsystem Availability
15. [UAS] Turnaround Time
16. Cost of Spares
17. [ISHM] Weight
18. Subsystem Weight
19. Fault Detection Coverage
20. Fault Isolation Coverage
21. [ISHM] False Alarm Rate
22. Subsystem False Alarm Rate
23. Net Present Value and IRR of
[UAS] program
24. Probability of unscheduled
maintenance

The DFT Model assesses the ability of a given instrumentation suite to detect and isolate
the faults for a proposed design, the size of ambiguity groups, and test point selection;
fault detection and fault isolation metrics are derived for the ISHM system from the DFT
Model. The LOM Model assesses the probability of failures that result in an inability to
complete a given mission; the primary output for the LOM Model is the probability of
loss of mission (as a metric). The Turnaround Model predicts the cost, time and resources
required to prepare the UAS for the next mission; it models scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance and the repair process. Typically this model uses discrete simulation to
output the new (ideally, lower) UAS turnaround times and costs of operations. The
Maintenance Model is used to provide maintenance-related input on a subsystem-bysubsystem basis as required by the turnaround and mission models. Figure 4 maps each
of the metrics to each other and to the relevant model [Datta, 2004].
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Figure 4 - The ISHM SA&O Quantification Process Map [Datta, 2004]

The SA&O process was found to have several shortcomings that hindered its application
and generalization to larger and more complex systems: it was only capable of producing
a ‘point-design’ instead of a suite of design alternatives, and it did not take into account
that there are global (shared) as well as local design parameters for each subsystem.
Building from the SA&O process and focusing on closing these gaps, the next approach
to ISHM analysis is known as ISHM Multidisciplinary Multi-objective Systems Analysis
and Optimization (MMSA&O). MMSA&O structures the design problem into a twolevel hierarchical architecture; an example can be seen in Figure 5.
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Figure 5 - Example Two-Tier Formulation of an ISHM Design Problem for a Reusable Launch
Vehicle (RLV) [Mehr, 2005]

In this process, ISHM is decomposed into a hierarchy of several sub-problems, each of
which may contain multiple objectives. In its multi-disciplinary form (as seen in Figure
6), the optimization problem can be organized into two levels: one sub-problem at the
system level, and J sub-problems at the sub-system level.
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Figure 6 - Multi-Disciplinary Form of a Multi-Objective Optimization Problem [Mehr, 2005]

The goal of this optimization approach is to obtain a set of solutions (

that

minimizes a weighted sum of R objectives while satisfying the constraints in all J subproblems. The equivalent single-level form of the multi-disciplinary problem is seen in
Equation 8.

(8)

where:
= functionally-separable objectives
= exclusive objectives
= shared variable vector
= variable vector exclusive to the sub-system
= system constraint vector
= constraint vector exclusive to the sub-system
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The solutions from each sub-problem are then rolled up to the top-level for integration;
however, since each sub-problem is solved independently, convergence matrices must be
used to guide the full system optimization [Mehr, 2005].

The SA&O process was proven to significantly improve the efficiency of ISHM
architecture, in one case study the percentage of total faults detected from the optimized
ISHM increased to 75% from 12% in the original design [Mehr, 2005]. Likewise, the
improved MMSA&O has seen percentages of total faults detected between 76 and 98%
[Hoyle, 2007].

Both of these models only focus on the safety, maintainability, and performance of the
new ISHM-enabled system. These models are missing a key environment that is
necessary when truly evaluating the full effect of ISHM: the mission environment. What
is the effect of higher availability and increased situational awareness on mission success
rates over the lifetime of the vehicle? The effect on mission effectiveness must be
quantified to help fully understand the cost/benefit tradeoff of ISHM.

2.6 Analytic Architecture
Historically, architecture and modeling had been performed relatively separately:
“On one side of the fence, systems engineers … [develop] the indepth integrated architectures to define system concepts for development
and production. On the other side, often times those evaluating the
concepts for decision makers develop simulations and models from
information obtained by performing their own research and interpretation
of the system concept. The result of this disconnect is often times an
inaccurate evaluation of the system that is actually developed and
produced” [Dietrichs, 2006].
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In 2006, a group of AFIT graduate students bridged this gap by combining the
Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) [DoD, 2012] and modeling
techniques into an analytic architecture, resulting in the development of the Architecture
Based Evaluation Process (ABEP) [Dietrichs, 2006].

The ABEP is made up of the following eight steps (see Appendix A: Architecture-Based
Evaluation Process (ABEP) for the process assumptions and further breakdown):
1. Design Operations Concept of System to be evaluated.
The Ops Concept provides the system operations which the architecture will
model.
2. Identify Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) relevant to the
decision/evaluation.
Identify the mission level metrics that represent the effectiveness of the
system.
3. Identify required level of abstraction for architecture to show traceability
to MOEs.
Analyze the Ops Concept to determine if MOEs are measured at the output of
a system, within a system, or at the output of activities external to the system.
4. Identify architecture views necessary to capture structure/relationships.
a. Structure (OV-1, OV-2, and OV-5 mandatory)
b. Decision Logic (OV-6a mandatory)
c. As Required: SV-2, SV-4, SV-7, OV-6b, OV-6c
5. Develop architecture views.
Develop or acquire the architecture views identified in Step 4 IAW DoDAF to
include all relevant activities and entities.
6. Develop Modeling and Simulation to replicate architecture.
a. Select modeling or analytical tools best suited to meet evaluation
requirements
b. Model structure of simulation or analytical solution to match
architecture
c. Model decision logic of simulation or analytical solution to match OV6a
d. Choose input parameters consistent with SV products
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e. Calculate MOEs at output of activities as functions of design
parameters
7. Evaluate Model Completeness.
Determine whether model considers all relevant aspects of the
system/concept.
8. Evaluate model for MOE results, requirements, and key parameters.
a. Once the model is complete, evaluate the system’s ability to meet
target metrics
b. Vary design parameters and perform sensitivity analysis to identify
key parameters
c. Compare sensitivity analysis to target MOEs to help establish/refine
requirements and KPPs
d. If not already accomplished, develop SV-7 Systems Performance
Parameters Matrix and identify critical performance parameters
e. Vary system design and design parameters to evaluate the system’s
robustness and its rate of degradation

2.7 Design of Experiments
Design of Experiments (DOE) is a type of statistical design in which
“purposeful changes are made to the input variables of a process or system so that
we may observe and identify the reasons for changes that may be observed in the
output response… [These experiments are planned] so that appropriate data will
be collected and analyzed by statistical methods, resulting in valid and objective
conclusions” [Montgomery, 2009].
For this research effort, DOE techniques will be used to supplement the ABEP when
evaluating models. The DOE techniques used will follow the seven guidelines provided
in Design and Analysis of Experiments by Dr. Douglas Montgomery [2009]:

1. Recognition of and Statement of the Problem
A clear statement of the problem provides a better understanding of the phenomenon
being studied and the final solution of the problem. It is important to keep the overall
objective in mind to avoid wasting time, materials, and other resources.
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2. Selection of the Response Variable
The response variable or variables “provides useful information about the process under
study.” This is often the output of a process, or a measurable characteristic of a system.
There may be one or more response variables.

3. Choice of Factors, Levels, and Range
Design factors are “those [variables] that the experimenter may wish to vary in the
experiment.” These factors are expected to have a large effect on the response variable.
Once the experimenter has selected the factors, they “must choose the ranges over which
these factors will be varied and the specific levels at which runs will be made.” A very
common method of choosing levels is to select a high and a low point that covers a range
that the experimenter deems is appropriate for operating conditions or is of interest to the
experiment.

4. Choice of Experimental Design
Choosing the design involves consideration of sample size, selection of an appropriate
run order, and determination of any restrictions in the design. The three basic principles
of experimental design are randomization, where both the allocation of resources and the
order in which the individual trials are performed are randomly determined; replication,
or independent repeats of each factor combination; and blocking, a design technique used
to improve the precision with this comparisons among the factors of interest are made.
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A common experimental design that combines these three principles is a factorial
experiment, in which factors are varied together instead of one at a time. This particular
experiment enables the experimenter to easily investigate the individual effects of each
factor and to determine where the factors interact. If there were k factors, each at two
levels (high and low), the factorial design requires 2k runs. Generally if there are more
than five factors, it becomes cumbersome to run all possible combinations of factor
levels.

Another experimental design, a fractional factorial experiment, is a variation of the
factorial experiment in which only a subset of the runs are used. These designs rely on
the experimenter assuming that certain high-order interactions are negligible, and that the
important information is found in the main factors and low-order interactions. This is also
known as the sparsity of effects principle. A major use of this experiment is for screening
factors to identify those factors (if any) that have large effects on the response.

5. Performing the Experiment
It is vital to monitor the process carefully to ensure that the procedure is executed
according to plan. Errors in procedure will usually destroy experimental validity.

6. Statistical Analysis of the Data
If the experiment has been designed correctly and performed according to the design, the
statistical methods required can be simple. The output of the experiment should be a
model that describes the response surface of the process or system being investigated.
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The most commonly used statistical inference procedure to validate this model is the
Analysis of Variance, which relies on portioning the total variability into its component
parts: variance due to the model, and variance due to random error. Certain assumptions
have to be satisfied for this procedure to be implemented, specifically that the errors are
normally and independently distributed with mean zero and constant but unknown
variance σ2. Violations of these assumptions can be investigated by examination of the
residuals, or the difference between the observed value and the predicted value. If the
model is valid the residuals should be structureless, or containing no obvious patterns.

7. Conclusions and Recommendations
Once the data has been statistically analyzed, the experimenter can draw practical
conclusions about the results and recommend a course of action. Confirmation testing can
be performed to validate the conclusions, if necessary. Often, full investigation of the
response surface involves iterative experimentation, as each new experiment builds on
the conclusions found in the last.

2.8 Literature Review Summary
This section discussed and identified several key terms, such as faults, failures,
prognostics and diagnostics, that are necessary for understanding an ISHM system and
identified current health management practices for Unmanned Aerial Systems. A typical
ISHM configuration was introduced and had the following components: a sensor suite
placed along critical system elements, and a management component that included sensor
data processing, diagnostic and prognostic algorithms to identify current or incipient
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faults, and a reasoner to select the appropriate mitigation steps to execute. The expected
performance, maintenance, and mission benefits of adding a typical ISHM configuration
to a UAS were identified and discussed.

Prior analytic models were also investigated. Most published research concerning
analytic modeling of Integrated System Health Management were found to be generally
concerned with quantifying the effects of ISHM on the performance and scheduled
maintenance of the intended recipient system. Few, if any, addressed the effect of ISHM
on mission success rates; most that did addressed this aspect at a mission level and did
not address the system degradation that would occur over the lifetime of the vehicle.
Finally, this chapter discussed the analytic architecture process model that will be used in
Chapter III to help quantify the effect of ISHM on mission success rates.
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III. Methodology

3.1 Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the process of developing an analytic
architecture to be used to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of installing an
ISHM system on a UAS. The development will follow the eight-step Architecture Based
Evaluation Process (ABEP) described in Section 2.6, and will be IAW the Department of
Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF).

3.2 Design ISHM Concept of Operations
Per Step 1 of the ABEP, Concept of Operations (CONOPs) will be developed based upon
discussions with the users. To help organize the competing objectives of ISHM and
ISHM’s analysis, two CONOPs will be built: the first detailing the ISHM system to be
implemented, the second focusing on the analytic architecture model. The CONOPs will
adhere to Air Force Policy Directive 10-28 and will outline basic Measures of
Effectiveness (MOEs), sequences of events, command relationships, and the expected
output data from the model.

The ISHM CONOPs is meant to be as general as possible and will take a system-level
view of the technology. Capabilities and characteristics will be taken mostly from the
research completed in the literature review with implementation directed at an Unmanned
Aerial System.
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The purpose of the Analytic Architecture CONOPs is to primarily answer the research
questions posed in Chapter I. For the purpose of this research effort, the architecture
created will provide a general baseline model that can be implemented over any
autonomous vehicle. The architecture will be built using the characteristics and
capabilities detailed in the ISHM CONOPs and will be used to design an analytic model
that quantifies the effect of ISHM on the operational availability and mission success
rate.

3.3 Identify Measures of Effectiveness
The next two steps, Step 2 and 3, continue development with the creation and analysis of
a list of MOEs to be used to evaluate ISHM. MOEs should primarily be derived from the
expected benefits of ISHM. Section 2.4, Table 3 and the ISHM CONOPs built in the
previous section list several metrics that have already been identified as pertaining to the
performance of ISHM. The MOEs chosen should reflect the purpose and desired output
of the analytic model, as they will ultimately guide the development of the model;
leaving out key evaluation metrics would cause an inappropriate output from the model.

Once the MOEs are chosen, they should be analyzed against the CONOPs to determine
where in the system (within, at the output, through an external system) they are
measured. The MOEs will also be used to identify within the overall system’s
architecture those products that specifically addressed ISHM. From these products, a
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Rules Model can be built that will abstract activities and will serve as the basis for the
ISHM simulation.

For this research effort, the analytic architecture will have the capability to ingest system
failure characteristics, in this case an appropriate failure distribution that models the total
system as well as probabilities of occurrence for the fault categories listed in Table 4, and
ISHM performance characteristics, such as the probability of detection, the probability of
a false alarm, and the diagnostic algorithm confidence level (a probability that the
diagnostic subsystem will correctly identify the fault). These categories are not exclusive
to degradation effects; the Estimated Time to Failure could be calculated for a component
experiencing long-term system degradation due to normal wear and tear or for a
component operating at a high level of stress. The analytic architecture will then have the
capability to use those input variables to calculate these metrics for a UAS with ISHM
and without ISHM for comparison: number of unscheduled maintenance actions, and the
rate of mission success.
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Table 4 - Fault Categories

Fault Category
I

Category Definition
The calculated Expected Time to Failure is much
greater than mission length. Maintenance can wait
until the next scheduled Preventative Maintenance
activity.

II

The calculated Expected Time to Failure is greater
than mission length. Unscheduled Maintenance
must occur after the current mission is completed.

III

The calculated Expected Time to Failure is less
than mission length, but mission can still be
completed with reduced capability. Unscheduled
Maintenance must occur after the current mission is
completed.

IV

The calculated Expected Time to Failure is less
than mission length and the UAS must abort the
mission and return to base immediately.
Unscheduled Maintenance must occur as soon as
possible.

V

Catastrophic Damage expected from fault. Loss of
vehicle occurs

3.4 Identify and Develop Architecture Views
Step 4 and 5 identifies and then develops the architecture views necessary to capture all
the inter-relationships. The ABEP offers several mandatory and recommended products
that should be developed to cover the overall structure and decision logic. Using the
previously developed CONOPs as the basis, nearly all evaluations will require an OV-1
(High Level Operations Concept) and OV-2 (Operational Node Connectivity
Description), and all will require an OV-5b (Operational Activity Model). The level of
abstraction for the OV-5 will have been identified in the previous section. For the
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decision logic, an OV-6a (Rules Model) will be developed to match the level of
abstraction used for the OV-5.

Additional necessary views will be identified through the CONOPs and the selected
MOEs. Some additional views called out by the ABEP that have been used in the past
include the SV-2 (Systems Resource Flow Description), SV-4 (Systems Functionality
Description), SV-7 (Systems Measures Matrix), OV-6b (State Transition Diagram), and
OV-6c (Event-Trace Description). All identified views will then be developed IAW
DoDAF guidelines.

Current views planned for this research effort are displayed in Table 5 along with their
purpose.
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Table 5 - Planned Architecture Views

Operational Views
OV-1

High Level Operations
Concept

OV-2

Operational Node
Connectivity Description

OV-5a Operational Activity
Decomposition Tree
OV-5b Operational Activity
Model
OV-6a Rules Model
System Views
SV-1

Systems Interface Model
All Views

AV-1

Overview and Summary
Information

Purpose
Provides a graphical depiction of what the
architecture is about and an idea of the
players and operations involved
Depicts Operational Needlines (flows of funding,
personnel and materiel in addition to
information) that indicate a need to exchange
resources
Decomposes the operational activities that are
normally conducted in the course of achieving a
mission
Describes input/output flows, dependencies and
relationships, and external interchanges between
operational activities
Describes the rules under which the architecture
behave under specified conditions
Purpose
Depicts all System Resource Flows between
Systems that are of interest
Purpose
Provides executive-level summary information in
a consistent form that allows quick reference and
comparison between views.

3.5 Develop Analytic Modeling and Simulation
Selecting the modeling or analytical tools best suited to meet the purpose of the analysis
is Step 6 of the ABEP. The model should be consistent with the architecture: the structure
should match the OV-2 and OV-5b products, the decision logic should be based off of the
OV-6a, and the parameters should be consistent with the systems described in the SV-1.
The additional views will not be directly involved with the analytic model but are
required to ensure the architecture products are consistent with each other: the OV-1 and
CV-1 provide general overviews for each viewpoint, the SV-5b ensures that the
38

operational activities in the OV’s are matched to the ISHM systems described in the SV1, and the AV-1 ties all the views together.

For this evaluation of the effect of ISHM on mission effectiveness, a spreadsheet model
will be built in Microsoft Excel. The model will run over the lifetime of a UAS, whose
failure characteristics serve as an input to the model, and will output unscheduled
maintenance actions and mission success rates using ISHM performance characteristics.
Each lifetime will be considered a Monte Carlo event, with each scheduled maintenance
interval or unscheduled maintenance repair acting as a renewal process for the UAS (a
process that restores the vehicle to “its original or ‘as good as new’ condition”) [Ebeling,
2010].

The full list of parameters needed for the model and their definitions are displayed in
Table 6; the inputs are divided between characteristics of the UAS and performance
measures of the proposed ISHM addition, the outputs are divided between expected
maintenance actions and a calculated rate of mission success as defined by Equation 7.
The user can also select how many Monte Carlo simulations to execute, up to 500
iterations of the lifetime of the UAS.
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Table 6 - ISHM Analytic Model Parameters

UAS Properties
(Input)
P(Failure)
P(Fault Categories)

Definitions
Probability of a failure occurring; a failure distribution
If a fault occurs, the probability of it falling into each of the five
fault categories; a number between 0 and 1 for each fault category

Average Mission
The average mission length for the UAS; in hours
Length
Scheduled
The interval between scheduled maintenance; in hours
Maintenance Interval
Expected System
The expected lifetime of the UAS; in hours
Lifetime
ISHM Properties
Definitions
(Input)
Probability of detecting a fault; between 0 and 1
P
D

PFA
DCL
Expected Model
Output
Baseline
Maintenance Actions
Baseline Rate of
Mission Success
ISHM Maintenance
Actions
ISHM Rate of
Mission Success
Model Properties
Number of
Simulations

Probability of the sensor reading a false alarm; between 0 and 1
ISHM’s Diagnostic Confidence Level, or the strength of the
prognostic and diagnostic algorithms; between 0 and 1
Definitions
Expected number of maintenance actions for a UAS using current
health management practices
Expected rate of mission success for a UAS using current health
management practices
Expected number of maintenance actions for the baseline UAS
with the addition of ISHM
Expected rate of mission success for the baseline UAS with the
addition of ISHM
Definitions
Number of lifetime simulations to execute; from 1 to 500

3.6 Evaluate Model
The model will then be evaluated for completeness and ability to meet the target metrics
in the final Steps 7 and 8. In Step 7, the model is evaluated solely on its ability to
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consider all relevant aspects (processes, assumptions, input variables, output data and
MOEs) of the concept. If the model is determined to not be complete, the process will
return to Step 3 with some additional considerations (listed in Appendix A: ArchitectureBased Evaluation Process (ABEP)). If the model is considered complete, the process will
proceed to Step 8.

The final step deals with the results of the model. Representative data for a UAS will be
fed into the model and Design of Experiments (DOE) techniques will be used to
determine situations where ISHM can be effectively used. The response for this analysis
is the difference between the number of successful missions calculated for a system
without ISHM (i.e. using current health management techniques) and a system with
ISHM. The intent is to explore the response surface where this difference is maximized,
which coincides with the operational area where ISHM would be most beneficial.
Representative data can be found in Table 7.
Table 7 - Representative UAS Data

UAS Properties

Values

P(Failure) - Distribution

Weibull Distribution

Average Mission Length

10 hours

Scheduled Maintenance Interval 1,000 hours
Expected System Lifetime

10,000 hours

Without actual UAS failure data, a Weibull failure distribution for P(Failure) was chosen
because of its ability to model the minimum of a large number of independent positive
random variables from several classes of distributions (i.e., the distribution is great at
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modeling a system of systems where a failure in one component causes a system-level
failure) [Meeker, 1998]. The scale and shape parameters will be left up to DOE analysis
to determine the region where the response is maximized.

The average mission length, scheduled maintenance interval, and expected lifetime were
chosen by the researcher to represent a typical UAS. They do not reflect any specific
aircraft in the USAF inventory.

3.7 Summary
This section went into detail as to how the ABEP is used to create an analytic model for
the purpose of evaluating ISHM. The architecture that will be built for the purposes of
this research effort will represent a general ISHM, as researched in Chapter II. The
analytic model based off this architecture will be focused primarily on analyzing mission
effectiveness using generated unscheduled maintenance actions and mission success
rates. The architecture, model, and model results are described in detail in Chapter IV.
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IV. Analysis and Results

4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter will present the completed architecture, resulting analytic model, and an
analysis of representative UAS failure data.

4.2 ISHM Architecture
This section details the architecture developed using the methodology in Chapter III.
Since the focus of this research effort is on the analytic nature of the architecture, only
views directly relevant to the analytic model will be discussed in detail in this section.
The full system architecture can be found in Appendix B: ISHM Architecture.

4.2.1 Integrated Systems Health Management Concept of Operations
The architecture relies heavily on a robust concept of operations, especially when
designing the systems and operations viewpoints. The full concept of operations for a
typical ISHM system can be found in Appendix B.1 Integrated System Health
Management Concept of Operations, but for the purposes of understanding the resulting
viewpoints in this chapter, critical portions of the necessary capabilities, enabling
capabilities, sequenced actions, and command relationships are described below.

43

Necessary Capabilities – Data Management
The ISHM system must provide continuous monitoring over the entirety of the vehicle.
Sensors are placed in critical locations in order to feed information on the state of the
system. Sensors can be conventional, measuring temperature, speed, and flow rate, or
specifically tailored to health management applications, such as strain gauges, ultrasonic
sensors, or proximity devices.

Data Management also includes parameter sets, vehicle configuration, and a data store
with a list of safe states associated with known fault events and mitigation steps. Current
mission sensor data and event recording can either be kept in an on-board data storage
system sent to ground as required, or continuously streamed to ground control.

Necessary Capabilities – Fault Detection
The sensor data is then processed to remove any artifacts or noises and manipulated to
extract fault features (either current or pre-cursers) and provide a comprehensive system
picture. Fault Detection combines diagnostic information with historical data (prognostic
reasoning) to generate an estimation of failure times. These fault indications are then
sorted, prioritized, and distributed to insure action within time to criticality. Algorithms
developed for diagnostic and prognostic calculations are generally based on mathematical
models (e.g. Hamilton dynamic, Lagrangian dynamic, approximation methods), or
pattern recognition (e.g. fuzzy-logic, statistical/regression methods, neural network
clustering).
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Necessary Capabilities – Fault Isolation
After identifying that a fault has occurred, ISHM must pinpoint the fault mechanism (i.e.
the specific cause of failure) and its location. If not identifiable through prognostic or
diagnostic reasoning, common fault mechanisms for that location can be identified using
historical failure data.

Necessary Capabilities – Health State Assessment
ISHM must have the capability to assess and assign levels of health to the vehicle. This is
achieved by calculating the remaining vehicle capabilities based on a capability model
and the current fault state of the system. A notional capability model is hierarchically
based, where the higher-level capability is computed using the values of the lower-level
capabilities and a mathematical expression. Faults are quantified at the lowest level with
system-level capability computations that orient this data with mission requirements to
determine effects on the vehicle.

Necessary Capabilities – Select Mitigation Procedures
The ISHM system will provide mitigation procedures in the event of a known fault for
the on-board flight control to act on if necessary. In order to perform this capability,
ISHM will a) examine the available resources to determine any performance limitations
and to estimate the time to criticality; b) confirm the diagnosed event and declare it to be
a valid vehicle event with a high confidence level; c) access the fault data store for the
appropriate safe state and the feasible step alternatives; before d) selecting the action
steps that allow completion within the criticality time and performance limitations. These
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action procedures will then be sent to the on-board flight control and to ground control.
Since ISHM operates only on known faults and known mitigations, any unknown fault
will immediately be assigned a critical level of health and the aircraft will automatically
return to base.

Enabling Capabilities
A formal Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) must be performed on
the vehicle prior to ISHM being implemented [Ebeling, 2010]. This is an iterative process
that identifies failure modes, assesses their probabilities of occurrence and their effects on
the system, isolating their causes, and determining corrective action or preventative
measures. The results of the FMECA should identify critical sub-systems or components
where sensors need to be applied, guide the diagnostic and prognostic algorithm creation,
and assign criticality to failure modes for health assessment purposes.

Sequenced Actions - Nominal Operations
The ISHM system will be continuously monitoring the health state of the UAS and will
communicate either continuously or on set intervals (barring a fault event) the health
status of the UAS. ISHM will also be continuously calculating an Estimated Time to
Failures for every monitored component.
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Sequenced Actions - Real-Time Fault Event
Once a failure occurs, the following actions should take place:
(1) ISHM locates the fault and identifies the failure mode
(2) ISHM assigns a criticality to the fault mode and adjusts the vehicle’s health
status to the appropriate level
(3) ISHM evaluates the new capability of the vehicle
(4) ISHM selects appropriate, deterministic, mitigation action procedures,
correlating them with mission and vehicle inhibits.
(5) ISHM sends the action procedures to the on-board flight control, and alerts the
Ground Operator and the Maintenance element
a. The on-board flight control can:
(i) Continue on current trajectory (ignore ISHM)
(ii) Use recommendations to autonomously reconfigure and/or
reshape the current trajectory
b. The Ground Operator, as appropriate and in accordance with the
criticality of the event, can:
(i) Override the on-board flight control decision and re-task within
its new capability
(ii) Defer to the autonomous on-board flight control decision
c. The Maintenance element executes maintenance actions as appropriate
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Sequenced Actions - Pre-Cursor to Fault is Detected
When a pre-cursor to a fault is detected, the following actions should take place:
(1) ISHM locates the affected component and identifies the impending failure
mode
(2) ISHM calculates an Estimated Time to System (or Component) Failure
(3) ISHM assigns a criticality to the fault mode and adjusts the vehicle’s health
status to the appropriate level
(4) ISHM evaluates the new capability of the vehicle
(5) ISHM selects appropriate, deterministic, mitigation action procedures,
correlating them with mission and vehicle inhibits.
(6) ISHM sends the action procedures to the on-board flight control, and alerts the
Ground Operator and the Maintenance element
a. The on-board flight control can:
(i) Continue on current trajectory (ignore ISHM)
(ii) Use recommendations to autonomously reconfigure and/or
reshape the current trajectory
b. The Ground Operator, as appropriate and in accordance with the
criticality of the event, can:
(i) Override the on-board flight control decision and re-task within
its new capability
(ii) Defer to the autonomous on-board flight control decision
c. The Maintenance element executes maintenance actions as appropriate
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Command Relationships - Ground Control
Ground systems are normally treated as separate systems, and their relationship to the
vehicle has typically been one of controller and operator; in this case, ground is
hierarchically superior to the vehicle and commands it for some mission phases but is
reactionary for others. Vehicle control transitions between ground and on-board
depending on mission phase and particular event conditions:






Before Launch
o Ground is master
o Control transitions to vehicle during launch sequence
During Flight
o Vehicle is master (autonomous)
o Ground monitors via downlink telemetry
o Ground takes control when appropriate
Post Landing
o Ground is master (after auto-safing)

Command Relationships - Maintenance and Logistics
Maintenance and Logistics can be considered part of ground control (under the
overarching domain of “Operations Control Center”) or a separate system entirely. Their
relationship to the vehicle is either reactionary or scheduled and does not consist of a
hierarchical relationship.

Interactions:


Scheduled Maintenance: Based on flight hours and is performed at either the
base-level or at a depot. Collected historical data from ISHM monitoring can be
used to highlight components that need to be inspected.
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Unscheduled Maintenance: Initiated when a fault has been discovered. Once the
ISHM has detected an anomaly, the appropriate data is sent to Maintenance and
Logistic for action.



Post Mission: Degradation and non-critical fault information are sent to
Maintenance and Logistics to improve vehicle turn-around time.

Command Relationships - On-Board Flight Control
The on-board flight control receives command to execute an action from ISHM generated
by either ISHM and/or ground C2. The autonomous on-board flight control will
decompose these decisions and action lists into a set of commands and send them to the
appropriate systems for execution. On-board flight control schedules these tasks
accordingly in order to complete in the prescribed time.

As a vehicle system, on-board flight control health status, events, time, and mission
information are continuously sent to ISHM. ISHM in turn continuously provides the
vehicle system health assessments, vehicle capability, and mitigation actions
predetermined for particular anomalies.

4.2.2 OV-5b Operational Activity Models
The OV-5b “Operational Activity Model” shows the activity flow needed for the
operation of a typical ISHM system. For graphical simplicity, ISHM has been divided
into three main activity models: the first (Figure 7) being the activities performed under
nominal mission operations; the second (Figure 8) concerning the actions performed
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when a fault is detected during a mission; and the third (Figure 9) the activities involved
over the lifetime of the UAS.
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«OV-5» act OV-5 [OV-5b Nominal Mission Operations]

Mission Start

«OperationalActiv ity»
Receiv e Data
No

«OperationalActiv ity»
Process Sensor Data

Yes

Fault Detected?

Fault
Detected
During
Mission
No
«OperationalActiv ity»
Store Data

Yes

Time for
Heartbeat?

«OperationalActiv ity»
Package Data

No

«OperationalActiv ity»
Transmit Data

Or

Mission Complete?

Yes

Mission
Complete

Figure 7 - OV-5b "Nominal Mission Operations"
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Since current health management or monitoring technologies also use sensors, the
activity flow through the diagram in Figure 7 is generally the same between a UAS with
ISHM and one without. The difference occurs when a fault is detected, without ISHM
there is no certainty as to what is actually occurring on the UAS and aside from a few
prevalent and simplistic fault conditions the UAS will be recalled to base, ending the
mission. With ISHM, greater system awareness is achieved and alternative mitigation
actions can be found other than immediately recalling the vehicle.

The OV-5b diagram “Fault During a Mission”, as seen in Figure 8, is where the bulk of
ISHM activities are performed. Once a fault (or multiple faults) is confirmed, ISHM
loops through the diagnostic and prognostic algorithms, determining the type and location
of the fault as well as calculating the estimated time to failure. This data is then pushed to
the decision reasoning system, where the faults are prioritized and the remaining
capability of the vehicle compared to the current mission tasking. Mitigation actions are
then selected from the data store and recommended for the vehicle’s autonomous
command and control system to evaluate. Ideally, the command and control system
would accept the mitigation actions, execute them, and the UAS would be re-tasked or
would continue on the mission as appropriate. A situation where the command and
control system would not accept the mitigation actions would be if ISHM recommended
actions that would cause the UAS to depart flight; although this is unlikely, the hierarchy
must be maintained as the autonomous command and control system is flight-critical and
ISHM is not.
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«OV-5» act OV-5 [OV-5b Fault During Mission]
Information Management System (System Level)

Prognostic/Diagnostic Modules (Subsystem Level)

Fault Detected During Mission

«OperationalActiv ity»
Confirm Fault Occurred

Fault(s)
Confirmed?
[No]

Yes
Faults
Left to
Analyze

More than One
Fault Detected?

«OperationalActiv ity»
Determine Type of Fault

«OperationalActiv ity»
Pinpoint Fault Location

«OperationalActiv ity»
Assign Criticality

«OperationalActiv ity»
Calculate Estimated Time
to Failure

All Faults Accounted For

«OperationalActiv ity»
Ev aluate Current
Capabilities

«OperationalActiv ity»
Prioritize Faults

«OperationalActiv ity»
Recommend Mitigation
Actions

Fault Category
< 5?

Yes

Fault Category
<4?

Yes

Mission Start
No

Vehicle Retired

No

Mission
Complete

Figure 8 - OV-5b "Fault During Mission”
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The activity flow through the OV-5b diagram “Lifetime Operations”, as seen in Figure 9,
also parallels UAS without ISHM activities. The difference would be found in the
quantity of activities performed, ideally a system with ISHM would have fewer
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance actions.

Theoretically, a system with ISHM would approach condition-based maintenance, where
all maintenance actions are driven by the prognostic and diagnostic modules, eliminating
scheduled maintenance. However, current ISHM technologies have not yet reached a
level of confidence where scheduled maintenance can be entirely removed from
maintenance operations. To represent how ISHM would be introduced to Air Force
operations in the current generation of technology, scheduled maintenance remains in the
architecture as a health management action.
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«OV-5» act OV-5 [OV-5b Lifetime Operations]
Vehicle
Placed in
Service

Scheduled
Maintenance
Required?

Yes

«OperationalActiv ity»
Perform Scheduled
Maintenance

Yes

«OperationalActiv ity»
Perform Unscheduled
Maintenance

No

Unscheduled
Maintenance
Required?

No
OR

«OperationalActiv ity»
Prepare Vehicle for
Mission

Vehicle at end of
Life?

No

Yes

Vehicle
Retired

Figure 9 – OV-5b "Lifetime Operations"
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4.2.3 OV-6a Rules Model
Development of the OV-6a Rules Model closely followed the development of the OV-5b
diagrams. The OV-6a model, seen in Figure 10, represents the decisions made by ISHM
over a single mission. The ISHM metrics that drive the model are the Probability of
Detection (PD), the Probability of a False Alarm (PFA), and the Diagnostic Confidence
Level (DCL). The Probability of Detection and Probability of a False Alarm are dependent
on the sensor quality. Generally, a higher Probability of Detection also equates to a
higher Probability of False Alarm. The Diagnostic Confidence Level represents the
quality of the diagnostic and prognostics algorithms. Better algorithms would give a
higher Diagnostic Confidence Level and therefore a better probability of assigning the
correct fault category for a detected fault. The Rules Model logic is discussed further in
Section 4.3.
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Figure 10 - OV-6a "Rules Model"

4.2.4 SV-1 Systems Interface Model
The SV-1 Systems Interface Model depicted in Figure 11 is for a UAS with ISHM using
current ISHM technology. In this architecture ISHM starts at the subsystem and
component level, with each critical subsystem having its own prognostic/diagnostic
module. Having the prognostic and diagnostic module at this lower level allows each
module to be individually configured to best interpret the health of that particular
subsystem. The prognostic and diagnostic module ingests data from the sensors (or
sensor suites, depending on the complexity of the subsystem), and can command system
effectors when investigating off-nominal conditions. An example of when effectors for a
subsystem would be utilized is when detecting structural cracks; the module would excite
a piezoelectric transducer (i.e. an effector), which would send out an elastic wave from
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the transducer, the wave would then be measured by sensors further down the component
and the module would evaluate the data for any deviations.
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«SV-1» composite structure SV-1 [SV-1]
Vehicle SubSystem/Component Level
On-board ISHM

«System»
Sensors
«SystemInterface»

«System»
Prognostic/Diagnostic Module
«System»
Effectors

«SystemInterface»

«SystemInterface»
Vehicle System Level
«System»
Information Management System

«Subsystem»
Information Management System::Reasoner

«SystemInterface»

«SystemInterface»

«System»
Vehicle Management System

«System»
Communication

Ground Systems
«CommunicationLink»

«CommunicationLink»

«CommunicationLink»

«System»
Ground Operations

«System»
Operational Control Center
«Subsystem»
Ground Operations::Maintenance Operations
«SystemInterface»

«Subsystem»
Ground Operations::Recov ery/Safing
«SystemInterface»

«Subsystem»
Ground Operations::Vehicle Checkout

«System»
Integrated System Health Management
Ground Station

«Subsystem»
Ground Operations::Launch Operations

«Subsystem»
Ground Operations::Logistics

Figure 11 - SV-1 "Systems Interface Model"
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The information from the subsystem and component level is then fed up to the system
level to an Information Management System. This system includes the decision reasoner,
a data store with a list of safe states associated with known fault events and mitigation
steps, and another data collection module to store health-related data and to process
information to be sent out as heartbeats (i.e. periodic health state assessments to groundbased operations) or maintenance actions, as appropriate. In the case of a fault, the
Information Management System assesses the new health of the vehicles (based on the
estimated time to failure and current UAS capabilities) and selects the mitigation steps to
be recommended the on-board command and control unit. This on-board command and
control unit is represented by the Vehicle Management System in the diagram.

The last level in the diagram includes the systems found at the ground level, to include
the Operations Control Center; Ground Operations such as maintenance and logistics;
and a ground component of ISHM. As with leaving scheduled maintenance as an activity
in the OV-5b, the current state of ISHM technology does not allow for full autonomy in
its decision making. Given time to review (some failures will be too imminent to allow
time for review), a ground-based operator will be reviewing the activities controlled by
ISHM, separate from the ground control center, and has the authority to override ISHM
commands when appropriate.

4.3 ISHM Analytic Model
Using the Rules Model created in Figure 10, a model was developed to simulate the
lifetime of a UAS and the effects of ISHM on the mission success rate and expected
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number of unscheduled maintenance actions. The model parameters were displayed
previously in Table 6.

The model begins by generating a random fault time (in hours) from the failure
distribution provided by the user, tFault, and four random numbers between 0 and 1:
RANDDetect, RANDFA, RANDCategory, and RANDCM. The model then determines if a fault
is detected, whether or not a fault has occurred, or if a fault was not detected, whether or
not a fault has occurred, for an average mission length (tM), Probability of Detection (PD),
and Probability of False Alarm (PFA) using Equation 9.

(9)

A fault category is then assigned using RANDCategory and the P(Fault Categories)
distribution provided by the user. Equation 10 displays how this category is assigned:

(10)
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A confusion matrix, displayed in Table 8, is used to determine the declared fault category
based upon CategoryTrue. The confusion matrix initiates using the diagnostic confidence
level, DCL, as the basis, but the model al lows the user to input values manually if
necessary.
Table 8 - Confusion Matrix

Confusion
Matrix

True Fault Category

Declared
Fault
Category

Nominal

I

II

III

IV

V

Nominal

DCL

(1-DCL)/2

0

0

0

0

I

1-DCL

DCL

(1-DCL)/2

0

0

0

II

0

(1-DCL)/2

DCL

(1-DCL)/2

0

0

III

0

0

(1-DCL)/2

DCL

(1-DCL)/2

0

IV

0

0

0

(1-DCL)/2

DCL

1-DCL

V

0

0

0

0

(1-DCL)/2

DCL

An example of using the confusion matrix given CategoryTrue = II can be seen in
Equation 11:

(11)
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CategoryTrue and CategoryDetect are then used to calculate mission success rates and
maintenance actions using the formulas found in Table 9. For this research effort,
partially completed missions are considered successful missions.
Table 9 - Mission Success and Maintenance Rates Formulas

System without ISHM

Formula

Mission Success?

1, if CategoryDetect = 0 AND CategoryTrue ≤ 2
0, otherwise

Maintenance Required?

1, if CategoryDetect = 1, 2, 3, 4
0, otherwise

System with ISHM

Formula

Mission Success?

1, otherwise
0, if CategoryDetect ≥ 4
OR CategoryTrue ≥ 3 when CategoryDetect ≤ 2
OR CategoryTrue ≥ 4 when CategoryDetect = 3
OR CategoryTrue = 5

Maintenance Required?

1, if CategoryDetect = 2, 3, 4
0, otherwise

The model then outputs the number of missions attempted, number of missions
completed successfully, and number of unscheduled maintenance actions initiated for
both a UAS with ISHM and without.

This model has several assumptions and limitations that need to be weighed to fully
understand how the results can be used by decision makers.


Each simulation is independent; a simulation being a lifetime of the UAS



Sensor and system degradation effects are not taken into account in this model
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The addition of ISHM causes negligible performance degradation of the UAS



The Probability of Detection (PD) and the Probability of False Alarm (PFA) are the
same for a UAS without ISHM (using current health management practices) and
with ISHM. In reality, ISHM would have additional sensors and effectors based
on the results of the FMECA, resulting in a different PD and PFA.



Any fault detected will result in a cancelled mission under current
detection/health management capabilities



The scheduled maintenance intervals act as a renewal process – that is, if the UAS
reaches a scheduled maintenance interval, the vehicle is returned to a “like new”
state.



PD and PFA are representative of the entire suite of sensors on the UAS. In reality,
each sensor would have its own individual performance characteristics.

The model was coded in Microsoft Excel© using Visual Basic Applications (VBA) for
Excel; the full code can be found in Appendix C: Analytic Model Code.

4.4 Model Analysis
As stated in Chapter III, the model will be analyzed using Design of Experiments (DOE)
techniques to determine the region where ISHM is most effective. As the model assumes
that the sensor characteristics are the same for the baseline UAS and the UAS with
ISHM, the model is best used to evaluate the situation where ISHM prognostic/diagnostic
modules and the information management system would be attached to the existing
sensors on the baseline UAS. The DOE techniques used in the section are taken from
Design and Analysis of Experiments by Douglas C. Montgomery and were described in
detail in Section 2.7 Design of Experiments [2009].

65

4.4.1 Design of Experiments Test Design
The first two guidelines, defining the problem and selecting the response variable, have
been discussed in depth previously in this section. The next step is to identify the design
factors and their appropriate levels. For this analytic model, there are 14 separate inputs
that can be used as design factors, as shown in Table 10.
Table 10 - Model Input

UAS Properties
P(Failure)

P(Fault Categories)

Average Mission Length
Scheduled Maintenance
Interval
Expected System Lifetime

Model Input
Failure Distribution (i.e. Normal); two
parameters (i.e. µ and σ)
P(Fault Category 1)
P(Fault Category 2)
P(Fault Category 3)
P(Fault Category 4)
P(Fault Category 5)
*sum of these probabilities must add to 1
tm
tpm
T

ISHM Properties

Model Input

Probability of detecting a fault PD
Probability of the sensor
PFA
reading a false alarm
Diagnostic Confidence Level DCL

As discussed in Chapter III, several of these factors will be fixed and will be used to
approximate a typical UAS: failure distribution, tM, tPM, and T. The remaining factors
then become the design factors and will be varied to investigate their effect on ISHM
effectiveness.
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A key factor in DOE is independence in the factors being investigated. This is not
possible for two groups of the factors: P(Fault Categories), which must sum to one; and
the sensor characteristics PD and PFA, which are dependent on each other. Instead of using
all five P(Fault Categories), two will be selected to represent this group. P(Fault Category
II) and P(Fault Category III) best reflect the difference in how mission success is
calculated in the model for a UAS with ISHM and for one using current health
management practices (see Table 9).

The sensor performance characteristics, PD and PFA are determined by Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves, which relate true positive fraction to false
positive fraction. The ROC curve model used in this research is shown in Equation 12
and is derived from [Moses, 1993]:
(12)
where the parameter c ϵ [1,∞] represents the quality of the sensor; as c increases, the
ROC improves, as c → ∞, the area under the curve approaches unity indicating perfect
classification. There are many ways to calculate c but for the purposes of this model no
specific equation will be provided, c will instead represent a general quality. A family of
ROC curves is presented in Figure 12.
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Figure 12 - Family of ROC Curves

To break the dependence on each other, only PD and sensor quality (c) will be evaluated
for the analysis.

The initial high (+1) and low (-1) discrete settings for each of the seven factors were
chosen with input from health management Subject Matter Experts at AFRL/RQ and are
displayed in Table 11. Center points are also included, as they are necessary to check for
curvature in the response surface.
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Table 11 - DOE Factor Levels

Factor
Weibull - Theta
Weibull - Beta
Sensor Quality
PD
P(Fault Category II)
P(Fault Category III)
DCL
Factor
Distribution
T
tM
tPM

-1
700
2.5
100
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.6

Discrete Settings
Center
+1
850
1000
2.75
3
300
500
0.6
0.9
0.25
0.4
0.25
0.4
0.75
0.9
Fixed Settings
Weibull
10,000 hrs
10 hrs
1,000 hrs

To test every combination of high/low factors in a factorial design, a 27 design would
require at least 128 runs, not including the additional center points and any replications.
With this in mind, a fractional factorial 27-4 Resolution III design with two replicates and
four center points was chosen, for a total of 28 runs. Each run would also include four
repeated measurements (i.e., four Monte Carlo trials) for a total of 12 measurements for
each test point selected. The high number of measurements for each test point was chosen
due to Excel’s inadequacies at random number generation. Previous research into Excel
has shown that Excel’s random number generation does not fulfill the basic requirements
for a random number generator to be used for scientific purposes [McCullough, 2008].
Since the model relies on primarily on the random number generator, a large number of
measurements for each test point will hopefully assuage the number generation problems.

The defining relationship for this experiment was chosen to alias higher order effects and
focus on the main factors and low-order interactions, following the sparsity of effects
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principle as discussed in Section 2.7: I = ABD = ACE = BCF = ABCG. For this
relationship A = Weibull-Theta, B = Weibull-Beta, C = Sensor Quality, D = Probability
of Detection, E = P(Fault Category II), F = P(Fault Category III) and G = the Diagnostic
Confidence Level. The full alias structure can be found in Appendix D: Design of
Experiments Results and Models.

4.4.2 Design of Experiments Results and Conclusions
The full experiment with test design, results, and statistical analysis can be found in
Appendix D: Design of Experiments Results and Models. A summary of the results and
the corresponding conclusions are detailed in this section. The statistical analysis in this
section was performed using JMP® Version 9.0.1.

One of the main results is that not all of the design factors are significant. Using an F-test,
only four main factors - Weibull-ϴ, PD, P(Fault Category III), and sensor quality - and
some low-order interactions were found to significantly affect the response. The
remaining factors can essentially be ignored when using the model to compare a UAS
with ISHM and without. Effect tests on the significant factors and interactions can be
found in Figure 13, the alpha level for the significance tests was 0.05. The model was
also found to include quadratic terms, in this case Weibull-ϴ * Weibull-ϴ and P(Fault
Category III)* P(Fault Category III), which indicated a second-order response surface
model and that some curvature would be seen in the response surface.
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Figure 13 - Effect Tests on Significant Factors and Interactions

The final model equation, displayed in Equation 13, mapping the response surface was
determined to be:

(13)

where y is the difference between the number of successful missions calculated
for a system with ISHM and the same system without ISHM (i.e. using
current health management techniques)

From this equation the stationary point is a region of minimum response, clearly visible
in Figure 14.
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Figure 14 - Response Surface for Analytic Model

While this response surface best illustrates the region were the response is at its
minimum, or the region where adding ISHM to the UAS baseline would not significantly
affect mission success rates, there can be some inferences made about the regions that
maximize the response. By not determining the ISHM performance characteristic (the
Diagnostic Confidence Level) significant, this evaluation implies that the benefits or
disadvantages of adding ISHM rely primarily on the performance of the baseline health
management system. Specifically, that ISHM becomes more beneficial as the baseline
health management system performs worse.
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Another useful result of this analysis is that the model equation can be used to test if
adding ISHM to a UAS will statistically affect the mission success rates. This can be
done using a two-sample t-test, because we can assume that the variance is equal between
mission success rates calculated for the UAS with ISHM and the UAS without. The t-test
uses the statistic found in Equation 14 [Montgomery, 2009]:
(14)

where

= the output of the model equation, the difference between the
number of successful missions calculated for a system without
ISHM and the same system with ISHM
= sample variance.
n = population size.

The Mean Square Error (MSE) calculated for the model can be used as an estimate of
sample variance. The sample size used to create the model, in this case 46 trials with four
repeated measurements for each trial, can be used as the population size. The addition of
ISHM would be considered statistically significant if

where

is the level

of significance. Using the model results detailed in Appendix D and an alpha of 0.05, the
updated Equation 15 becomes:

(15)
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Using Equation 12 it can be inferred that if the difference between the expected number
of successful missions calculated for a system without ISHM and the same system with
ISHM is greater than 4.726, then the addition of ISHM to the baseline UAS will result in
a statistically significant difference in mission success rates. Since the mission success
rate difference is always positive, the addition of ISHM can be considered a beneficial
addition in terms of mission success rates.

4.5 Summary
This chapter covered the final products and results from the methodology presented in
Chapter III. An analytic architecture was created using the Architecture Based Evaluation
Process and then evaluated using Design of Experiments techniques. Results from the
evaluation indicated that installing ISHM in existing UAS platforms is only worthwhile,
in terms of mission effectiveness, when the existing UAS’s health management system
has significant detection and false alarm problems. The products and model results will
form the basis of this research effort’s conclusions and recommendations discussed in
Chapter V.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter will answer the research objectives and discuss areas for future research.

5.2 Research Questions Answered
The focus of this research effort was to quantify the mission-related benefits of ISHM by
constructing architecture for analysis to compare against current autonomous vehicle
capabilities, and to provide a general baseline model that can be implemented over any
current or future autonomous vehicle. To do this, a literature review was conducted to
answer the following questions, posed initially in Chapter I:

What is the current status of UAS health management?
The Air Force UAS programs currently use independent sensors incorporated into the
vehicle’s hardware to monitor for fault indicators on critical subsystems. The sensor data
is continuously transmitted to ground operations where it is then processed to detect
anomalies. If the data indicates a fault has occurred the ground operator will execute predetermined mitigation steps, dependent on which sensor indicated a fault, and relay a
message to the maintenance and logistics element. Once the vehicle lands, maintenance
personnel perform diagnostic tests to confirm the location and identify the type of fault,
and then perform maintenance actions to restore the component. This is less health
management than health monitoring, in terms of nomenclature.
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What are the essential elements of ISHM?
A typical ISHM system consists of sensors placed at critical components within
subsystems of the vehicle that stream data to a management system. The management
system processes the sensor data, executes diagnostic and prognostic algorithms, and then
feeds this information through a reasoner, as previously displayed in Figure 3. This
management system can either be on-board the vehicle in a hardware configuration or
off-board enabling the ground command and control (C2) element.
Management System
On-Board C2

Figure 3 - Typical ISHM configuration [Benedettini, 2009]

Sensors can be conventional or specifically tailored to health management applications.
The sensor data is then processed to remove any artifacts or noises and manipulated to
extract fault features. The diagnostic module then analyzes the fault features to detect,
identify, and isolate developing failure conditions. The diagnostic information will be
combined with historical data in the prognostic module to generate an estimation of
failure times. Finally, the diagnostic and prognostic information is turned over to the
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reasoner module which analyzes available resources, decides which hazard mitigation
steps to execute, and then passes the selected decision to the on-board C2 module and
relays appropriate information to the ground C2 operator and maintenance element
[Benedettini, 2009].

What are the expected benefits of ISHM?
There were five areas that were determined to benefit the most from adding ISHM to
UAS platforms: rate of scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, repair times, operational
availability, mission success, and cost. With ISHM implemented, the probability of
unscheduled maintenance should decrease as unscheduled maintenance becomes more
fault driven and scheduled maintenance intervals can also be investigated for potential
relaxation or removal. Ideally, the aircraft would replace time-based or event-driven
maintenance with a condition-based maintenance system, where maintenance is only
performed based on objective evidence of actual or predictable failure of a system or its
components [OSAIDD, 1999]. Repair times would decrease as adding prognostic
technology would result in each subsystem or component having an estimated time to
failure. Knowing which systems are near failure ahead of time would again allow the
maintenance element time to pre-position the necessary maintenance equipment and
personnel or order any necessary replacement parts.

Based on the decreased downtime in unscheduled maintenance and scheduled
maintenance from ISHM, the operational availability for each aircraft should improve.
Another factor affecting operational availability is mission turn-around time, or the time
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from when the aircraft lands to when it is ready for the next mission. Without ISHM,
mission turn-around time can include lengthy inspection tests to check for failures. Since
these tests are not needed with continuous monitoring and a higher confidence in fault
detection, the mission turn-around time should decrease, increasing operational
availability. Mission success rates would also theoretically increase as having situational
awareness of the entire health state of the vehicle assists ground operations in providing
full mission coverage. If a UAS autonomously detects a fault and due to the fault
criticality (for example, low fuel levels) decides to re-task to a closer trajectory, ground
operations can re-task other UAS vehicles to ensure coverage of the priority targets.
Without ISHM, a fault alert would generally give no indication of the remaining
performance capability of the UAS, leaving ground operations to conservatively scrap
that particular mission set. ISHM can also theoretically expand the flight envelope of the
aircraft, which could allow for larger mission sets.

The previous benefits all have some measure of cost savings attached to them. Having a
lower total maintenance downtime, due to decreases in scheduled maintenance and a
lower probability of unscheduled maintenance, leads to a lower personnel cost and even
an option of having less maintenance personnel needed. Fewer maintenance actions also
indicate a potential reduction in spares and supply costs. However, there is an inherent
cost in implementing ISHM, not just to the vehicle but to the resulting operational
infrastructure. The cost savings must be weighed against the implementation costs to
truly investigate the financial aspect of ISHM.
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The answers to the literature review questions were then used to develop an analytic
architecture that would answer these primary research questions:

What are the potential impacts to ground control stations and users?
With the addition of ISHM, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) move closer to a state of
true autonomy and less reliance is placed on ground control stations. As with any new
technology, a phased approach would be appropriate when integrating this technology
with current practices.

The architecture built for this effort is designed for the initial phase and resembles a state
of flexible autonomy, where command and control (C2) of the UAS shifts from
autonomous to operator based on mission phase and particular event conditions. In
general, ground C2 (as represented by the Operations Control Center in the SV-1)
commands the vehicle before launch and post landing, and the autonomous C2 takes over
during the launch sequence and releases command during auto-safing. Currently, the
ground C2 still maintains significant control through the whole flight, even though the
autonomous capability is there. ISHM should help to increase the level of autonomy
within future UAS since ISHM would provide an estimation of the system's current
abilities to enable real-time decision making by the vehicles C2. If designed for some
UAS platforms, such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk, ground C2 would consist of separate
Launch and Recovery (LRE) and Mission Control Elements (MCE). Also depending on
the UAS, ground C2 can have the ability to control multiple vehicles at a single time. So
far, this is not structurally any different from current UAS operations as performed by the
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United States Air Force. Implementing ISHM into the UAS concept of operations would
not eliminate any of the current ground C2 infrastructure but would instead require the
addition of another element, the ISHM Ground Station, whose sole purpose is to monitor
and verify the decisions made by ISHM. This element would not have personnel attached
to it, it is instead another computer or set of computers with the more complex algorithms
that would not be able to stored on the aircraft due to the processing speed limitations.
ISHM would also affect current users on the ground by potentially increasing the number
of vehicles that can be controlled at once; with health management handed over to the
vehicle, ground C2 has the ability to potentially manage more UAS. Additional human
factors analysis would be completed to determine the maximum amount of vehicles that
ground C2 can safely control.

Ideally in the next phase (as confidence in ISHM and autonomous technology increases),
the entire mission from launch to recovery would become fully automated, with ground
C2 only managing the mission taskings or re-taskings. Ground operations, previously
managed by multiple elements, such as the LRE, MCE, and ISHM Ground Station, can
potentially be combined into one center. This could significantly lower the amount of
personnel needed to operate a UAS.

What are the potential impacts on current maintenance practices?
The end-goal of ISHM is a state of condition-based maintenance, where maintenance is
only performed based on objective evidence of actual or predictable failure of a system or
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its components [OSAIDD, 1999]. Mirroring the impact on ground control stations, the
changes to maintenance practices should take a phased approach.

The initial phase of ISHM implementation, as built in the architecture, closely resembles
current practices. There are still scheduled maintenance intervals; however, by providing
continuous monitoring and knowing the Estimated Time to Failure for the critical
components, these intervals have the potential to be relaxed. The other main impact
would be in the response to faults. Before, time-intensive Built-in Test (BIT) units would
be used to verify that the fault exists and to pinpoint which component to repair. ISHM
verifies the fault in flight and provides reams of data to the maintenance element for their
own verification, negating the use of the BIT unit. Also, by knowing the specific systems
to be inspected or repaired ahead of time, the maintenance element has time to preposition the necessary equipment and personnel or order any necessary replacement parts
before the UAS has completed its mission.

The next phase would involve upgrading to condition-based maintenance. Scheduled
maintenance intervals would no longer exist and the entire concept of operations for
maintenance would become reactionary.

What are the performance characteristics necessary for ISHM to effect mission
success?
A response surface was modeled for a UAS with an expected lifetime of 10,000 hours,
maintenance interval of 1,000 hours, and average mission length of 10 hours. The final
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model equation, initially shown in Equation 13, mapping this surface was determined to
be:
(13)

where y is the difference between the number of successful missions calculated
for a system with ISHM and the same system without ISHM (i.e. using
current health management techniques)

Contour plots for the response surface near this point are provided in Figure 15. The
statistical analysis performed in Section 4.4.2 determined that a response greater than
4.726 indicated a statistically significant difference in mission success rates. The shaded
regions on the contour plots indicate areas where ISHM is not beneficial. If the factors
fall anywhere outside of this region, ISHM should be investigated as a beneficial addition
to the existing UAS in terms of mission success rates.
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Figure 15 - Contour Plots for Response Surface

83

The architecture also contributed to answering these secondary questions:

How should ISHM data be presented to be effective? How will the presentation change
in regards to the different users of ISHM (operators, maintenance, etc.)?
As seen in the OV-2, displayed in Figure 16, there are several types of information that
are passed from ISHM to ground-level operations: vehicle status, vehicle capabilities, and
maintenance reports. Additional human factors research will be needed to determine how
this information is presented to the users; in this architecture there are three main users of
the data: the Operations Control Center (OCC), the ISHM Ground Station (in the OV-2,
the OCC and ISHM Ground Station are combined under “Ground Command and
Control”), and Ground Recovery Operations consisting of maintenance and other launch
and recovery operations. While maintenance reports are unique to Ground Recovery
Operations, the OCC and the ISHM Ground Station exploit the vehicle status and
capabilities differently; consideration of this point must be taken when researching the
best way to present the data to the personnel of each element.
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«OV-2» class OV-2 [OV-2]

Integrated Systems Health Management

«Subsystem»
Integrated Systems Health Management::
Prognostic/Diagnostic

Vehicle Management System

Health Status, Fault Detection, IMS Commands
«Needline»

Vehicle Status, Mititgation
Actions, Vehicle Capabilities

«Needline»

«System»
Integrated Systems Health Management::
Information Management System

Vehicle Status, Vehicle Capabilities

Maintenance Reports

«Needline»

«Needline»

Ground Command and Control

Ground Recov ery Operations

Figure 16 - OV-2 “Operational Node Connectivity Description”

Is ISHM cost effective?
The main result of the model evaluation indicated that the quality of sensors will affect
the cost and mission benefits relative to the degree of ISHM implemented on a system. A
cursory interpretation of this analysis result infers that decision makers should compare
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the cost and mission benefits of upgrading the sensors with the cost and benefits of
implementing ISHM; however, a complete cost and mission benefit analysis should be
completed before making any conclusions and will require a more in-depth ISHM model
than that presented in this paper. The model presented in this research effort lays the
foundation to develop the more in-depth model.

While no cost data was included in the model, the output from the model can be also used
when evaluating the total financial benefit of ISHM. By putting a cost on an average
unscheduled maintenance action, the expected number of maintenance actions, as output
by the model, for a UAS without ISHM and one with ISHM can be compared. The model
can also be used to determine the effect of longer scheduled maintenance intervals on
expected unscheduled maintenance actions for a UAS with ISHM. The cost saved by
having longer scheduled maintenance intervals can be added to the financial evaluation
for decision makers.

The expected mission success rate can also be used to decide whether ISHM is cost
effective. There is a cost associated with preparing a UAS for launch and with the
recovery actions once the UAS has landed. If a UAS would have to curtail its mission or
cancel it entirely because of health management issues, another UAS would be tasked to
complete the mission, and could incur additional launch and recovery costs if it had to be
launched from scratch. The expected mission success rate for a UAS with ISHM and for
one without ISHM could be quantified as an expected cost per mission and then
compared for evaluation by decision makers.
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5.3 Recommendations for Future Research
There are numerous opportunities for further research into this aspect of Integrated
System Health Management. A large benefit to the research would be lifting some of the
assumptions under which the analytic model operates. One large assumption is that the
scheduled maintenance intervals act as a renewal process; this is not close to reality, as
the system will degrade over time, even with adequate maintenance intervals. A second
model assumption follows along the same lines, only in this case assuming that there are
no sensor degradation effects over the lifetime of the vehicle. Over time, the probability
of detection for the sensor will decrease and/or the probability of a false alarm will
increase. Another large assumption is that ISHM uses the same sensor suite that is
currently in the baseline UAS; following the results of the FMECA, ISHM would
actually supplement the original health management or monitoring system with additional
sensors and effectors. The model should be updated to reflect these changes; this will
give a more accurate representation of the reliability and health management aspects of
the baseline UAS.

Much of this research effort used theoretical values when evaluating the model and
mapping the response surface. If actual failure data for current UAS platforms or
information becomes available for commercially-implemented ISHM systems, this
information can be fed into the model and the response surface can be re-evaluated.
Large ranges were used for the theoretical values to try and cover a variety of potential
UAS platforms and ISHM systems; this leads to potential model inadequacy because
local maximum and minimum ridges may not have been discovered. Actual ISHM
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performance data will hopefully give much smaller ranges and a more robust response
surface can be determined.

5.4 Summary
In this research effort, an analytic architecture was created to help determine the effect
ISHM had on mission success rates for a UAS. The final products revealed that, for
mission success rates only, ISHM is beneficial in situations where the theoretical UAS
has serious problems with detection and false alarm rates. Using representative data for a
UAS, the analysis determined that the failure distribution parameters, sensor quality
(which determines the relationship between probability of detection and probability of
false alarm), and probability of an imminent fault during a mission were significant to the
model. The result of the model determined that ISHM can result in a significant
improvement on mission assurance, especially when implemented with higher quality
sensors and on vehicles where the probability of imminent failure is higher relative to the
mission times and time between preventative maintenance. This appears consistent with
the premise that ISHM can support an extension of preventative maintenance intervals
with an attendant reduction in sustainment cost.

It is important to note that the analytic model had several broad assumptions that affect
these conclusions: (1) the model assumed that ISHM would use the same sensor suite that
is currently in the baseline UAS – this does not reflect reality, ISHM would have
additional sensors and effectors based on the results of the FMECA, resulting in a
different PD and PFA; (2) the model is limited to detecting faults that the current system is
88

looking for – theoretically, ISHM would gather data over the lifetime of the vehicle to
supplement these fault states as new information becomes available; (3) the model does
not allow for system or sensor degradation – this negates a lot of the benefits provided by
prognostics. Additional analysis is needed to further study the effect of ISHM on mission
effectiveness. These results should also be taken as just one part of the “big picture” of
ISHM, and should be weighed against the other benefits that ISHM provides.

89

Appendix A: Architecture-Based Evaluation Process (ABEP)

1. Design Operations Concept of system to be evaluated.
Ops concept provides the system description which the architecture will model,
and the models will simulate/evaluate.
2. Identify Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) relevant to the decision/evaluation
Identify the metrics that represent the effectiveness of the system.
3. Identify required level of abstraction for architecture to show traceability to
MOE’s
Analyze the Ops Concept to determine if MOE’s are measured at the output of the
system, within the system (requiring ‘drilling’ into the system activities), or at the
output of activities external to the system (requiring external systems diagram)
4. Identify architecture views necessary to capture structure/relationships
a. Structure (OV-1, OV-2, and OV-5) In order to first develop the structure of the
analysis, nearly all evaluations will require the OV-1 (High Level
Operations Concept), OV-2 (Operational Node Connectivity Description),
and OV-5 Operational Activity Model views. The level of abstraction (A1, A-0, AO etc.) of the OV-5 is initially identified in the previous step.
b. Decision Logic (OV-6a) to capture the logic of the system, nearly all
evaluations will require the OV-6a Rules Model, developed to match the
level of abstraction used for the OV-5’s.
c. As Required: SV-2, SV-4, SV-7,OV-6b, OV-6c Depending on the complexity,
consideration for time and dependency on internal performance inputs,
some or all of the listed views may be required.
5. Develop architecture views
Develop architecture views in accordance with DODAF to include all relevant
activities and entities. If an integrated architecture already exists, then acquire the
required architecture views.
6. Develop Modeling Simulation to replicate architecture
a. Select Modeling tool best suited to meet evaluation requirements (i.e. Excel
spreadsheet vs. discrete model simulation program)
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b. Model structure to match architecture (OV-2, OV-5)
c. Model decision logic to match OV-6a.
d. Calculate MOE‟s at output of activities as functions of design parameters

7. Evaluate Model Completeness
Does model consider all relevant aspects (processes, assumptions, input variables
and outputs, MOE‟s) of the system/concept?
a. If so, continue to step 8.
b. If model not complete, return to step 3 with the following considerations.
i. Determine additional architecture view and/or level of abstraction
required to achieve traceability between system and the missing
aspect.
ii. Develop required additional architecture
iii. Modify model to include additional architecture view.
iv. Re-evaluate Step 7 until model captures all relevant aspects of the
concept.
8. Evaluate model for MOE results, requirements and key parameters
a. Once the model is complete, evaluate the system’s ability to meet target
metrics.
b. Vary design parameters and perform sensitivity analysis to identify key
parameters.
c. Compare sensitivity analysis to target MOE’s to establish requirements and
KPPs.
d. Identify critical performance parameters in the SV-7 Systems Performance
Parameters Matrix.
e. Vary system design and design parameters to evaluate the system’s robustness
and its rate of degradation.
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Appendix B: ISHM Architecture

B.1 Integrated System Health Management Concept of Operations
1.0 Purpose
Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) adds a centralized health management
system that is responsible for collecting and processing health status information from
across a system during all mission phases. ISHM balances data flow from multiple subsystems and produces the information necessary to identify current system capabilities,
provide situational awareness to mission and ground operations, and quickly identify
contingencies for improved vehicle control and mission decisions. In order to be
effective, ISHM must have the capability to: assess vehicle state; reliably detect,
diagnose, and predict failures and degraded conditions; derive and relay accurate vehicle
health status to the ground operations crew, maintainers, and the on-flight vehicle
command and control module. These capabilities would allow the operator or vehicle to
re-plan the mission, reconfigure flight control and continue, or abort as necessary in realtime.
2.0 Time Horizon, Assumptions, and Risks
This section discusses the time horizon for the future of ISHM, and the assumptions and
risks overlaying the use of ISHM.
2.1 Time Horizon
In the near term (0-10 yrs), ISHM is envisioned to provide condition-based maintenance,
remaining life-quantification, mission-readiness decision making, and improved fault
isolation and detection to the operator.
In the far term (10+ yrs), as systems reach for true autonomy, ISHM will enable an
autonomous vehicle to re-plan its own mission based on actual system health and
capabilities, collaborate with other autonomous vehicles to ensure mission and capability
coverage, and define its own operating envelope.
2.2 Assumptions
(1) The ISHM system will currently have no command or control over the
autonomous vehicle; it only provides recommended actions for flight control
and ground control.
2.3 Risks
(1) If ISHM lacks integrity, the false alarm rate will increase the probability of
unscheduled maintenance over current health monitoring systems.
(2) The added weight of an ISHM system will decrease the capability of the system.
(3) The added cost of an ISHM could outweigh the benefits of the system.
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(4) If ISHM is less reliable than the vehicle, the probability of unscheduled
maintenance will increase over current health monitoring systems.
3.0 Description of the Military Challenge
In 2010, the United States Air Force (USAF) released the results of a year-long study
highlighting the need for increasing autonomy in modern weapon systems, especially in
the domain of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The study identified the need for greater
system autonomy as the “single greatest theme” for future USAF Science and
Technology investments. [Technology Horizons, 2010] Current technology
advancements have brought the USAF to a state of flexible autonomy, which involves
dynamically shifting command and control (C2) from autonomous to operator based on
workload, system health, and the perceived intent of the operator.
One of the key attributes sustaining flexible autonomy is the ability of the UAS to detect,
isolate, and diagnose system health problems to relay back to ground C2, the on-board
flight control module, and maintainers for appropriate action. Current flight avionics
architectures may include lower level sub-system health monitoring or may isolate health
monitoring functions to a black box configuration, but a vehicle-wide health monitoring
information system has seldom been implemented.
4.0 Synopsis
ISHM provides the basis for integrating all the individual system’s health management
inputs and outputs (I/O) on a particular vehicle and determines, in real-time, the vehicle’s
health status and mission capabilities. The overall desired effect of an ISHM system
would be an increase in mission success rates, driven by improved operational
availability, increased health awareness, faster turnaround times, and false alarm
avoidance. In order to perform this capability, ISHM must provide continuous monitoring
over the entirety of the vehicle, identify that a fault has occurred, pinpoint the fault
mechanism and its location, assess and assign a level of health to the vehicle, and relay
selected fault data to the ground operator for action.
5.0 Desired Effects
The overall desired effect of an ISHM system would be to detect and isolate either a realtime fault or pre-cursers to a fault, determine the criticality of the fault, and then relay the
appropriate information back to ground control for action. Benefits of this capability are
discussed in the remaining sub-sections.
5.1 Effect on Scheduled and Unscheduled Maintenance
The Air Force goal for prognostic systems such as ISHM is to completely eliminate
traditional aircraft inspection and repair patterns. [Ross, 1999] Currently, a
malfunctioning unit is either identified in-flight (based off an alert from an individual
sensor) or identified through scheduled inspections. There are an inherent probability of a
false alarm and a probability of fault detection, meaning that the aircraft could be
incorrectly pulled from an on-going mission or could continue on a mission with an
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unknown fault that could lead to system failure. The integrated aspect of ISHM proposes
to severely reduce the false alarm rate and increase the total probability of detection, as
understanding the full health status of the vehicle can identify false positives and identify
if a fault or failure has occurred down-stream. For example: a sensor falsely identifies a
valve stuck closed, a sensor further down the stream indicates a normal flow rate and the
system has not lost any performance aspects; ISHM would therefore not report this as a
fault.
With the continuous monitoring provided by ISHM, pre-cursors to faults can also be
identified and an Estimated Time to Failures of the component or total system will be
reported. Additionally, if multiple mission data is stored, every time a fault occurs, the
data collected by ISHM can be used to identify new indicators or pre-cursors to a failure
to be uploaded into the diagnostic and prognostic algorithms.
The overall result is that with ISHM implemented, the probability of unscheduled
maintenance should be minimized and scheduled maintenance intervals can be relaxed or
removed. Ideally with ISHM, the aircraft would replace time-based or event-driven
maintenance with a condition-based maintenance system, where maintenance is only
performed based on objective evidence of actual or predictable failure of a system or its
components. [OSAIDD, 1999]
5.2 Decreased Mean Time to Repair
Current fault detection is limited to identifying the occurrence of a fault and an
approximate location, meaning that fault isolation can only occur after the aircraft has
landed. There is also a probability that the mechanic can even correctly identify the
failure mode once it lands. With ISHM, both fault detection and isolation are performed
in-flight, within a specified confidence level, and the appropriate information is relayed
to the maintenance element. This gives the maintenance element time to pre-position the
necessary maintenance equipment and personnel or order any necessary replacement
parts, severely reducing the total Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) after an event.
As a result of its continuous monitoring, ISHM would also reduce maintenance time
during scheduled inspections. Prognostics would, theoretically, calculate an Estimated
Time to Failure (ETF) for each component, resulting in each inspection only focusing on
those systems that had passed an ETF threshold in that time interval. Knowing that the
specific systems to be inspected ahead of time would again allow the maintenance
element time to pre-position the necessary maintenance equipment and personnel or order
any necessary replacement parts. ISHM would also negate the current use of timeintensive Built-in Test (BIT) units, as each system would be continuously tested.
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5.3 Operational Availability Improvement
Based on the decreased downtime in unscheduled maintenance and scheduled
maintenance from ISHM, the Operational Availability for each aircraft should improve.
Another factor affecting Operational Availability is mission turn-around time, or the time
from when the aircraft lands to when it is ready for the next mission. Without ISHM,
mission turn-around time can include lengthy BIT tests to check for failures, since these
tests are not needed with continuous monitoring and a higher confidence in fault
detection the mission turn-around time should decrease, increasing Operational
Availability. Whether measured in maintenance downtime or a reduction in hours
required for testing and diagnostics, etc., the net result is that a system with ISHM will be
available for use more of the time.
5.4 Increased Mission Success
Having situational awareness of the entire health state of the vehicle assists ground
operations in providing full mission coverage. If a UAS autonomously detects a fault and
due to the fault criticality (for example, low fuel levels) decides to re-task to a closer
trajectory, ground operations can re-task other UAS vehicles to ensure coverage of the
priority targets. Without ISHM, a fault alert would generally give no indication of the
remaining performance capability of the UAS, leaving ground operations to
conservatively scrap that particular mission set.
An additional aspect of increased situational awareness is its affect on UAS flight limits.
Modern autonomous flight control systems limit the vehicle to safe operating loads and
environments; this operating envelope is pre-defined and very conservative. With ISHM,
the flight envelope can theoretically be expanded and defined by the design criteria for
the vehicle. Health data would then be used to restrict the envelope to a prescribed level
in the event of a detected fault. This would increase the operational capability of the
vehicle, allowing for larger mission sets. Improved situational awareness combined with
the theoretical improved Operational Availability would greatly improve the rate of
mission success.
5.5 Cost Savings
The previous benefits all have some measure of cost savings attached to them. Having a
lower total maintenance downtime, due to decreases in scheduled maintenance and a
lower probability of unscheduled maintenance, leads to a lower personnel cost and even
an option of having less maintenance personnel needed. Fewer maintenance actions also
indicate a potential reduction in spares and supply costs. The on-board test diagnostics
provided by ISHM would also theoretically replace some ground test equipment, as it
would become redundant.
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6.0 Necessary Capabilities
The capabilities necessary for ISHM to be effective are appropriate data and information
management, fault detection and isolation, the ability to assess the health status of the
UAS, and communication, both internal and external to the system.
6.1 Data Management
The ISHM system must provide continuous monitoring over the entirety of the vehicle.
Sensors are placed in critical locations in order to feed information on the state of the
system. Sensors can be conventional, measuring temperature, speed, and flow rate, or
specifically tailored to health management applications, such as strain gauges, ultrasonic
sensors, or proximity devices.
Data Management also includes parameter sets, vehicle configuration, and a data store
with a list of safe states associated with known fault events and mitigation steps. Current
mission sensor data and event recording can either be kept in an on-board data storage
system sent to ground as required, or continuously streamed to ground control.
6.2 Fault Detection
The sensor data is then processed to remove any artifacts or noises and manipulated to
extract fault features (either current or pre-cursers) and provide a comprehensive system
picture. Fault Detection combines diagnostic information with historical data (prognostic
reasoning) to generate an estimation of failure times. These fault indications are then
sorted, prioritized, and distributed to insure action within time to criticality. Algorithms
developed for diagnostic and prognostic calculations are generally based on mathematical
models (e.g. Hamilton dynamic, Lagrangian dynamic, approximation methods), or
pattern recognition (e.g. fuzzy-logic, statistical/regression methods, neural network
clustering).
6.3 Fault Isolation
After identifying that a fault has occurred, ISHM must pinpoint the fault mechanism (i.e.
the specific cause of failure) and its location. If not identifiable through prognostic
reasoning, common fault mechanisms for that location can be identified using historical
failure data.
6.4 Health State Assessment
ISHM must have the capability to assess and assign levels of health to the vehicle. This is
achieved by calculating the remaining vehicle capabilities based on a capability model
and the current fault state of the system. A notional capability model is hierarchically
based, where the higher-level capability is computed using the values of the lower-level
capabilities and a mathematical expression. Faults are quantified at the lowest level with
system-level capability computations that orient this data with mission requirements to
determine effects on the vehicle.
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6.5 Select Mitigation Procedures
The ISHM system will provide mitigation procedures in the event of a known fault for
the on-board flight control to act on if necessary. In order perform this capability, ISHM
will a) examine the available resources to determine any performance limitations and to
estimate the time to criticality; b) confirm the diagnosed event and declare it to be a valid
vehicle event with a high confidence level; c) access the fault data store for the
appropriate safe state and the feasible step alternatives; before d) selecting the action
steps that allow completion within the criticality time and performance limitations. These
action procedures will then be sent to the on-board flight control and to ground control.
Since ISHM is deterministic and operates only on known faults and known mitigations,
any unknown fault will immediately be assigned a critical level of health and the aircraft
will automatically return to base.
6.6 Communication
The ISHM must be able to send and receive messages internally and externally to the
vehicle.
7.0 Enabling Capabilities
A formal Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) must be performed on
the vehicle prior to ISHM being implemented. This is an iterative process that identifies
failure modes, assesses their probabilities of occurrence and their effects on the system,
isolating their causes, and determining corrective action or preventative measures. The
results of the FMECA should identify critical sub-systems or components where sensors
need to be applied, guide the diagnostic and prognostic algorithm creation, and assign
criticality to failure modes for health assessment purposes.
8.0 Sequenced Actions
There are three main use cases for ISHM: no faults occur, a fault event occurs real-time,
and pre-cursors to a fault are identified. See Appendix 11.1 for key nomenclature
definitions.
8.1 Nominal Operations
The ISHM system will be continuously monitoring the health state of the UAS and will
communicate either continuously or on set intervals (barring a fault event) the health
status of the UAS. ISHM will also be continuously calculating an Estimated Time to
Failures for every monitored component.
8.2 Real-Time Fault Event
Once a failure occurs, the following actions should take place:
(1) ISHM locates the fault and identifies the failure mode
(2) ISHM assigns a criticality to the fault mode and adjusts the vehicle’s health
status to the appropriate level
(3) ISHM evaluates the new capability of the vehicle
(4) ISHM selects appropriate, deterministic, mitigation action procedures,
correlating them with mission and vehicle inhibits.
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(5) ISHM sends the action procedures to the on-board flight control, and alerts the
Ground Operator and the Maintenance element
a. The on-board flight control can:
(i) Continue on current trajectory (ignore ISHM)
(ii) Use recommendations to autonomously reconfigure and/or reshape the
current trajectory
b. The Ground Operator, as appropriate and in accordance with the criticality
of the event, can:
(i) Override the on-board flight control decision and re-task within its new
capability
(ii) Defer to the autonomous on-board flight control decision
c. The Maintenance element executes maintenance actions as appropriate
8.3 Pre-Cursor to Fault is Detected
When a pre-cursor to a fault is detected, the following actions should take place:
(1) ISHM locates the affected component and identifies the impending failure
mode
(2) ISHM calculates an Estimated Time to System (or Component) Failure
(3) ISHM assigns a criticality to the fault mode and adjusts the vehicle’s health
status to the appropriate level
(4) ISHM evaluates the new capability of the vehicle
(5) ISHM selects appropriate, deterministic, mitigation action procedures,
correlating them with mission and vehicle inhibits.
(6) ISHM sends the action procedures to the on-board flight control, and alerts the
Ground Operator and the Maintenance element
a. The on-board flight control can:
(i) Continue on current trajectory (ignore ISHM)
(ii) Use recommendations to autonomously reconfigure and/or reshape the
current trajectory
b. The Ground Operator, as appropriate and in accordance with the criticality
of the event, can:
(i) Override the on-board flight control decision and re-task within its new
capability
(ii) Defer to the autonomous on-board flight control decision
c. The Maintenance element executes maintenance actions as appropriate
9.0 Command Relationships
ISHM will have no command and control over the UAS at this time. The ISHM system
will need to communicate with the following systems/subsystems:
9.1 Ground Control
Ground systems are normally treated as separate systems, and their relationship to the
vehicle has typically been one of controller and operator; in this case, ground is
hierarchically superior to the vehicle and commands it. For events that happen during a
mission, the ground will take control to determine the needed actions and then send the
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commands to the vehicle for execution. The vehicle interfaces with ground control to
capture, analyze, and preserve vehicle health data.
Vehicle control transitions between ground and on-board depending on mission phase
and particular event conditions:
 Before Launch
o Ground is master
o Control transitions to vehicle during launch sequence
 During Flight
o Vehicle is master (autonomous)
o Ground monitors via downlink telemetry
o Ground takes control when appropriate
 Post Landing
o Ground is master (after auto-safing)
9.2 Maintenance and Logistics
Maintenance and Logistics can be considered part of ground control (under the
overarching domain of “Operations Control Center”) or a separate system entirely. Their
relationship to the vehicle is either reactionary or scheduled and does not consist of a
hierarchical relationship.
Interactions:
 Scheduled Maintenance: Based on flight hours and is performed at either the
base-level or at a depot. Collected historical data from ISHM monitoring can be
used to highlight components that need to be inspected.
 Unscheduled Maintenance: Initiated when a fault has been discovered. Once the
ISHM has detected an anomaly, the appropriate data is sent to Maintenance and
Logistic for action.
 Post Mission: Degradation and non-critical fault information are sent to
Maintenance and Logistics to improve vehicle turn-around time.
9.3 Vehicle Systems
ISHM collects status and event snapshots from the vehicle subsystems and processes the
information using various health algorithms and reasoning capabilities.
9.4 On-Board Flight Control
The on-board flight control receives command to execute an action from ISHM generated
by either ISHM and/or ground C2. The autonomous on-board flight control will
decompose these decisions and action lists into a set of commands and send them to the
appropriate systems for execution. On-board flight control schedules these tasks
accordingly in order to complete in the prescribed time.
As a vehicle system, on-board flight control health status, events, time, and mission
information are continuously sent to ISHM. ISHM in turn continuously provides the
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vehicle system health assessments, vehicle capability, and mitigation actions
predetermined for particular anomalies.
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B.2 Architecture Concept of Operations
1.0 Purpose
The focus of this research is to quantify the mission-related benefits of ISHM by
constructing architecture for analysis to compare against current autonomous vehicle
capabilities, and to provide a general baseline model that can be implemented over any
current or future autonomous vehicle. The architecture capabilities will include the ability
to analyze the causal relationship of ISHM performance metrics (to include the
performance of the processor, and the performance and reliability of the monitoring
sensors) to mission performance. The architecture is aimed at primarily answering the
following questions:
(1) What are the potential impacts to ground control stations and users?
(2) What are the potential impacts on current maintenance practices?
(3) What are the performance characteristics necessary for ISHM to effect
mission success?
The architecture should also contribute to answering these secondary questions:
(1) How should the ISHM data be presented?
(2) Is ISHM cost effective?
2.0 Time Horizon, Assumptions, and Risks
This section discusses the time horizon for the architecture, the assumptions overlaying
the architecture, and the risks inherent in using this architecture and analysis tool.
2.1 Time Horizon
The architecture and preliminary analysis should be built and completed by December of
2012 with the project out-brief scheduled for March of 2013. Additional interim gates
will be established as the project progresses.
2.2 Assumptions
At this point in ISHM development:
(1) This architecture does not analyze ISHM past the system level; however, the
architecture can be easily modified to include components and subsystems
that are of value to the researcher.
(2) At this point in ISHM development, the ISHM system has no command or
control over the autonomous vehicle. ISHM in its current technology state
only provides recommended actions based on the type of fault it detects. The
vehicle’s autonomous management system will prioritize actions as
necessary or, if there is time, a ground-based ISHM team can overrule or
direct mitigation actions as necessary.
2.3 Risks
(1) If the selected metrics for analysis either do not accurately describe ISHM or
are not independent of each other, the optimization process will give an
analysis that does not appropriately model the system.
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3.0 Description of the Military Challenge
ISHM is currently being considered for implementation in unmanned aerial systems
(UAS) for the United States Air Force. Before the USAF can move forward, the effects
of ISHM both on-ground and in-flight need to be understood and evaluated. This project
intends to perform an in-depth analysis on the advantages and disadvantages of adding an
ISHM system to general or specific UAS through the use of DODAF architecture and
optimization processes.
4.0 Synopsis
This concept intends to perform an in-depth analysis on the advantages and disadvantages
of adding an ISHM system to a general or specific UAS through the use of architecture.
The architecture will have the capability to optimize a given ISHM’s fault detection rate,
fault isolation coverage rate, false alarm rate, and calculate the mean time to repair, mean
time between failure, probability of scheduled maintenance, probability of unscheduled
maintenance, and turn-around time for a UAS with ISHM. To use the architecture and
analysis tool, the user will select desired metrics, modify the system’s objectives and
constraints, input the results of the Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis,
integrate the ISHM architecture into the overall system architecture, execute the analysis,
and then perform sensitivity analysis on the results.
5.0 Desired Effects
This architecture should provide a general baseline model that can be implemented over
any autonomous vehicle and to quantify the effect of ISHM on the operational
availability and mission success rate by comparing them to current autonomous vehicle
capabilities. The architecture should have the capability to optimize the ISHM fault
detection rate, fault isolation coverage rate, false alarm rate, and the expected weight of
the ISHM. The architecture should have the capability to use those optimized rates to
calculate these metrics for a UAS with ISHM: mean time between failures (MTBF),
probability of scheduled maintenance, probability of unscheduled maintenance,
operational availability, and the probability of mission success.
6.0 Necessary Capabilities
The capabilities necessary to use the ISHM architecture are that the architecture is
flexible, supports analysis and optimization, and is easy to use.
6.1 Flexible
The architecture should have the capability to be modified to fit any UAS baseline
architecture. This architecture should also have the capability to be expanded on for
future generations of UAS and ISHM technologies.
6.2 Analysis and Optimization
This architecture should have the capability to support an evaluation model. The
particular modeling or analytical tools (such as spreadsheets or discrete event simulation,
or through a simulation software product such as ARENA) can be chosen by the user.
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6.3 Ease of Use
The architecture and analysis process should be straightforward and clear. Any user that
has some prior knowledge of ISHM and DoDAF architecture should have the ability to
understand the architecture and perform some level of modification as appropriate and
appreciate its use as an analysis tool.
7.0 Enabling Capabilities
In order to operate the architecture, a Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis must
be performed, and the overall architecture of the system must be built.
7.1 Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis
A formal Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) must be performed on
the UAS prior to using this ISHM architecture. This is an iterative process that identifies
failure modes, assesses their probabilities of occurrence and their effects on the system,
isolating their causes, and determining corrective action or preventative measures. The
results of the FMECA should identify critical sub-systems or components where sensors
need to be applied, guide the diagnostic and prognostic algorithm creation, and assign
criticality to failure modes for health assessment purposes.
7.2 UAS Architecture
The architecture for the overall system for which ISHM is going to be analyzed should be
should be built prior to using this lower level ISHM architecture; the intent of the lower
level ISHM architecture is to be integrated into the overall system architecture. The
following metrics from the baseline vehicle should be collected for use in the
architecture: Mean Time to Repair (MTTR), MTBF, rate of scheduled maintenance,
probability of unscheduled maintenance, operational availability, and the probability of
mission success.
8.0 Sequenced Actions
To execute the architecture, take the following steps:
(1) Select Metrics: Select the metrics that the user is interested in for analysis.
(2) Modify Objectives and Constraints: Modify the selected objectives and
constraints to reflect the metrics that the user is interested in.
(3) Input results of FMECA: Enter in the failure data for each subsystem as a
parametric distribution. Assign criticality to identified failure modes.
(4) Modify the Architecture: Integrate the ISHM architecture into the overall
system architecture. Use the results of the FMECA to highlight the critical
systems that need to be monitored and determine the number of sensors to be
implemented in each system.
(5) Execute Analysis
(6) Perform Sensitivity Analysis.
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B.3 AV-1
1.0 Architectural Description
Previous generation health monitoring technology was typically local to a given
subsystem; the next generation, Integrated System Health Management (ISHM), adds a
centralized health management system to a typical flight avionics configuration. It is
responsible for collecting and processing vehicle health status information from across
the vehicle during all mission phases. As a consequence it will enhance the ability to
make on-board decisions, thus migrating strict ground control to shared vehicle
autonomy. ISHM performs health management at the vehicle- and mission-level from
events and diagnostics gathered at the subsystem level.
ISHM is currently being considered for implementation in unmanned aerial systems
(UAS) for the United States Air Force (USAF). Before the USAF can move forward, the
effects of ISHM both on-ground and in-flight need to be understood and evaluated. The
focus of this architecture is to quantify the mission-related benefits of ISHM by
constructing architecture for analysis to compare against current autonomous vehicle
capabilities, and to provide a general baseline model that can be implemented over any
current or future autonomous vehicle. The architecture capabilities will include the ability
to analyze the causal relationship of ISHM performance metrics (to include the
performance of the processor, and the performance and reliability of the monitoring
sensors) to mission performance.
2.0 Scope
The architecture is aimed at primarily answering the following questions:
(1) What are the potential impacts to ground control stations and users?
(2) What are the potential impacts on current maintenance practices?
(3) What are the performance characteristics necessary for ISHM to effect
mission success?
The architecture should also contribute to answering these secondary questions:
(1) How should ISHM data be presented to be effective? How will the
presentation change in regards to the different users of ISHM (operators,
maintenance, etc.)?
(2) Is ISHM cost effective?
2.1 Architectural Views and Products Contained
This architecture contains Operational and System views.
The Operational views include a High Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1) to
graphically describe the operational concept, an Operational Resource Flow Description
(OV-2) to describe the resource flows exchanged between operational activities, and
Operational Activity Models (OV-5a and OV-5b) to describe the relationships, inputs,
and outputs between operational activities. These Operational views model the static
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structure of the architectural elements and their relationships. An additional Operational
view that describes dynamic behavior is the Operational Rules Model (OV-6a), which
defines operational procedures and constraints.
The planned system view is the Systems Interface Description (SV-1), which identifies
systems, system items, and their interconnections.
2.2 Project Timeline
The architecture and preliminary analysis should be built and completed by December of
2012 with the project out-brief scheduled for March of 2013. Additional interim gates
will be established as the project progresses.
3.0 Purpose and Perspective
The purpose of the architecture is to provide a general baseline model that can be
implemented over any autonomous vehicle and to quantify the effect of ISHM on the
operational availability and mission success rate by comparing them to current
autonomous vehicle capabilities. The architecture should have the capability to optimize
the ISHM fault detection rate, fault isolation coverage rate, false alarm rate, and the
expected weight of the ISHM. The architecture should have the capability to use those
optimized rates to calculate these metrics for a UAS with ISHM: mean time between
failures (MTBF), probability of scheduled maintenance, probability of unscheduled
maintenance, operational availability, and the probability of mission success.
4.0 Tools and File Formats Used
The architecture will be built in Enterprise Architect v8.0 (student) and presented in three
formats: Word documents, HTML reports, and XML data files.
5.0 Assumptions and Constraints
This section includes assumptions and constraints needed to understand the architecture
and its intended usage.
5.1 Assumptions
(1) Cost will not be evaluated
(2) At this point in ISHM development, the ISHM system has no command or
control over the autonomous vehicle. ISHM in its current technology state
only provides recommended actions based on the type of fault it detects. The
vehicle’s autonomous management system will prioritize actions as
necessary or, if there is time, a ground-based ISHM team can overrule or
direct mitigation actions as necessary.
5.2 Constraints
In order to make a general baseline model, it is not possible to represent every possible
aspect of ISHM. Therefore this architecture will not analyze ISHM past the system level;
however, the architecture can be easily modified to include components and subsystems
that are of value to the researcher.
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6.0 Supporting Analysis
Representative data for a UAS will be fed into the model and Design of Experiments
(DOE) techniques will be used to determine situations where ISHM can be effectively
used. The response for this analysis is the difference between the number of successful
missions calculated for a system without ISHM (i.e. using current health management
techniques) and a system with ISHM. The intent is to explore the response surface where
this difference is maximized, which coincides with the operational area where ISHM
would be most beneficial.
7.0 Findings
A response surface was modeled for a UAS with an expected lifetime of 10,000 hours,
maintenance interval of 1,000 hours, and average mission length of 10 hours. The final
model equation mapping this surface was determined to be:

where y is the difference between the number of successful missions calculated for a
system with ISHM and the same system without ISHM (i.e. using current health
management techniques)
Contour plots for the response surface near this point are provided in the figures below.
The statistical analysis determined that a response greater than 4.726 indicated a
statistically significant difference in mission success rates. The shaded regions on the
contour plots indicate areas where ISHM is not beneficial. If the factors fall anywhere
outside of this region, ISHM should be investigated as a beneficial addition to the
existing UAS in terms of mission success rates.
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B.4 OV-1
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B.5 OV-2
«OV-2» class OV-2 [OV-2]

Integrated Systems Health Management

«Subsystem»
Integrated Systems Health Management::
Prognostic/Diagnostic

Vehicle Management System

Health Status, Fault Detection, IMS Commands
«Needline»

Vehicle Status, Mititgation
Actions, Vehicle Capabilities

«Needline»

«System»
Integrated Systems Health Management::
Information Management System

Vehicle Status, Vehicle Capabilities

Maintenance Reports

«Needline»

«Needline»

Ground Command and Control

Ground Recov ery Operations

109

«OperationalActiv ity»
Package Data

«OperationalActiv ity»
Manage Data

«OV-5» act OV-5 [OV-5a]
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«OperationalActiv ity»
Transmit Data

«OperationalActiv ity»
Receiv e Data

«OperationalActiv ity»
Process Sensor Data

«OperationalActiv ity»
Store Data

«OperationalActiv ity»
Determine Type of Fault

«OperationalActiv ity»
Confirm Fault Occurred

«OperationalActiv ity»
Detect Faults

«OperationalActiv ity»
Recommend Mitigation
Actions

«OperationalActiv ity»
Pinpoint Fault Location

«OperationalActiv ity»
Calculate Estimated Time
to Failure

«OperationalActiv ity»
Isolate Faults

«OperationalActiv ity»
Health Management

«OperationalActiv ity»
Ev aluate Current
Capabilities

«OperationalActiv ity»
Prioritize Faults

«OperationalActiv ity»
Assign Criticality

«OperationalActiv ity»
Assess Health

«OperationalActiv ity»
Prepare Vehicle for
Mission

«OperationalActiv ity»
Perform Unscheduled
Maintenance

«OperationalActiv ity»
Perform Scheduled
Maintenance

«OperationalActiv ity»
Serv ice Vehicle

B.6 OV-5a

B.7 OV-5b
«OV-5» act OV-5 [OV-5b Nominal Mission Operations]

Mission Start

«OperationalActiv ity»
Receiv e Data
No

«OperationalActiv ity»
Process Sensor Data

Yes

Fault Detected?

Fault
Detected
During
Mission
No
«OperationalActiv ity»
Store Data

Yes

Time for
Heartbeat?

«OperationalActiv ity»
Package Data

No

«OperationalActiv ity»
Transmit Data

Or

Mission Complete?

Yes

Mission
Complete
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«OV-5» act OV-5 [OV-5b Fault During Mission]
Information Management System (System Level)

Prognostic/Diagnostic Modules (Subsystem Level)

Fault Detected During Mission

«OperationalActiv ity»
Confirm Fault Occurred

Fault(s)
Confirmed?
[No]

Yes
Faults
Left to
Analyze

More than One
Fault Detected?

«OperationalActiv ity»
Determine Type of Fault

«OperationalActiv ity»
Pinpoint Fault Location

«OperationalActiv ity»
Assign Criticality

«OperationalActiv ity»
Calculate Estimated Time
to Failure

All Faults Accounted For

«OperationalActiv ity»
Ev aluate Current
Capabilities

«OperationalActiv ity»
Prioritize Faults

«OperationalActiv ity»
Recommend Mitigation
Actions

Fault Category
< 5?

Yes

Fault Category
<4?

Yes

Mission Start
No

Vehicle Retired

No

Mission
Complete
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«OV-5» act OV-5 [OV-5b Lifetime Operations]
Vehicle
Placed in
Service

Scheduled
Maintenance
Required?

Yes

«OperationalActiv ity»
Perform Scheduled
Maintenance

Yes

«OperationalActiv ity»
Perform Unscheduled
Maintenance

No

Unscheduled
Maintenance
Required?

No
OR

«OperationalActiv ity»
Prepare Vehicle for
Mission

Vehicle at end of
Life?

No

Yes

Vehicle
Retired
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B.8 OV-6a
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B.9 SV-1
«SV-1» composite structure SV-1 [SV-1]
Vehicle SubSystem/Component Level
On-board ISHM

«System»
Sensors
«SystemInterface»

«System»
Prognostic/Diagnostic Module
«System»
Effectors

«SystemInterface»

«SystemInterface»
Vehicle System Level
«System»
Information Management System

«Subsystem»
Information Management System::Reasoner

«SystemInterface»

«SystemInterface»

«System»
Vehicle Management System

«System»
Communication

Ground Systems
«CommunicationLink»

«CommunicationLink»

«CommunicationLink»

«System»
Ground Operations

«System»
Operational Control Center
«Subsystem»
Ground Operations::Maintenance Operations
«SystemInterface»

«Subsystem»
Ground Operations::Recov ery/Safing
«SystemInterface»

«Subsystem»
Ground Operations::Vehicle Checkout

«System»
Integrated System Health Management
Ground Station

«Subsystem»
Ground Operations::Launch Operations

«Subsystem»
Ground Operations::Logistics
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Appendix C: Analytic Model Code

Dim ConfMatrix(6, 6) As Double
Dim RandCat As Double, TrueCat As Single, Detect As Single
Dim SysCat1, SysCat2, SysCat3, SysCat4, SysCat5, SysParam1, SysParam2
Dim NumFalseAlarms, NumFaults, NumFaultsDetected, NumIncorrectDeclared
Dim ProbAlarm, ProbDetect, ProbDiagnostic, MissionSuccessOld, MissionSuccessNew
Dim MissionLength, MaintLength, MonteCarloNum, Lifetime, NumMissions
Dim Results() As Integer, SumTotal(8) As Integer
Sub UserForm_Start()
UserForm1.Show
End Sub
Sub MonteCarloSim(flag As Boolean)
If flag = False Then
With Worksheets("HiddenCM")
For i = 1 To 6
For j = 1 To 6
ConfMatrix(i, j) = .Cells(7 + i, 2 + j).Value
Next j
Next i
End With
End If
Worksheets("Calculations").Activate
ReDim Results(MonteCarloNum, 8)
For i = 1 To 8
SumTotal(i) = 0
Next i
'Run simulation
With Worksheets("Calculations")
Application.Goto .Range("A1:P38")
ActiveWindow.Zoom = True
.Cells(5, 13).Select
'Populate Calculation page
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.Cells(4, 2).Value = ProbDetect
.Cells(5, 2).Value = ProbAlarm
.Cells(6, 2).Value = ProbDiagnostic
.Cells(4, 5).Value = SysCat1
.Cells(5, 5).Value = SysCat2
.Cells(6, 5).Value = SysCat3
.Cells(7, 5).Value = SysCat4
.Cells(8, 5).Value = SysCat5
.Cells(3, 11).Value = MissionLength
.Cells(4, 11).Value = NumMissions
.Cells(5, 11).Value = MaintLength
.Cells(6, 11).Value = Lifetime
.Cells(7, 11).Value = MonteCarloNum
MaintNum = Int(Lifetime / MaintLength)
For i = 1 To MonteCarloNum
NumFalseAlarms = 0
NumFaultsDetected = 0
NumFaults = 0
NumIncorrectDeclared = 0
NumSuccessMsns_Old = 0
NumMaint_Old = 0
NumSuccessMsns_New = 0
NumMaint_New = 0
For j = 1 To MaintNum
'System Distribution
If UserForm1.SystemDist = "Normal" Then
temp1 = Application.WorksheetFunction.NormInv(Rnd(), SysParam1,
SysParam2)
ElseIf UserForm1.SystemDist = "Lognormal" Then
temp1 = Application.WorksheetFunction.LogInv(Rnd(), SysParam1,
SysParam2)
ElseIf UserForm1.SystemDist = "Weibull" Then
temp1 = SysParam1 * (-Log(1 - Rnd())) ^ (1 / SysParam2)
Else 'Gamma'
temp1 = Application.WorksheetFunction.GammaInv(Rnd(),
SysParam1, SysParam2)
End If
tempHours = 0
NumFaults_temp = 0
NumFalseAlarms_temp = 0
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NumFaultsDetected_temp = 0
NumIncDecl_temp = 0
NumSuccessMsns_Old_temp = 0
NumMaint_Old_temp = 0
NumSuccessMsns_New_temp = 0
NumMaint_New_temp = 0
flagX = False
flagY = False
For k = 1 To NumMissions
tempHours = tempHours + MissionLength
tempRow = Range("A13").End(xlDown).Offset(1).Row
.Cells(tempRow, 1) = tempHours
'Fault Occured
If temp1 < tempHours Then
Fail = 1
NumFaults_temp = NumFaults_temp + 1
Else
Fail = 0
End If
.Cells(tempRow, 2) = Fail
Rand1 = Rnd()
Rand2 = Rnd()
'Detection Prob
If Fail = 1 Then
If Rand1 < ProbDetect Then
Detect = 1
Else
Detect = 0
End If
Else
If Rand2 < ProbAlarm Then
Detect = 1
Else
Detect = 0
End If
End If
.Cells(tempRow, 3) = Detect
'False Alarms? Detected Failure?
If Fail = 0 And Detect = 1 Then
NumFalseAlarms_temp = NumFalseAlarms_temp + 1
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End If
If Fail = 1 And Detect = 1 Then
NumFaultsDetected_temp = NumFaultsDetected_temp + 1
End If
RandCat = Rnd()
'True Fault Category
If RandCat < SysCat1 Then
TrueCat = 1 * Fail
ElseIf RandCat < SysCat2 Then
TrueCat = 2 * Fail
ElseIf RandCat < SysCat3 Then
TrueCat = 3 * Fail
ElseIf RandCat < SysCat4 Then
TrueCat = 4 * Fail
Else
TrueCat = 5 * Fail
End If
.Cells(tempRow, 4) = TrueCat
'Declared Fault Category
DetectCat = DeclareMatrix(RandCat, TrueCat, Detect)
.Cells(tempRow, 4) = TrueCat
.Cells(tempRow, 5) = DetectCat
'Incorrectly Declared?
If TrueCat <> DetectCat Then
NumIncDecl_temp = NumIncDecl_temp + 1
End If
'Mission Success Calculations
If DetectCat >= 1 Or TrueCat >= 3 Or flagX = True Then
SuccessMsn = 0
Else
SuccessMsn = 1
NumSuccessMsns_Old_temp = NumSuccessMsns_Old_temp + 1
End If
.Cells(tempRow, 7) = SuccessMsn
If DetectCat >= 4 Or (TrueCat >= 3 And DetectCat <= 2) Or _
(TrueCat >= 4 And DetectCat = 3) Or TrueCat = 5 _
Or flagY = True Then
SuccessMsn2 = 0
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Else
SuccessMsn2 = 1
NumSuccessMsns_New_temp = NumSuccessMsns_New_temp + 1
End If
.Cells(tempRow, 9) = SuccessMsn2
'Maintenance Required?
If DetectCat >= 1 And DetectCat < 5 Then
MaintRx_Old = 1
NumMaint_Old_temp = NumMaint_Old_temp + 1
Else
MaintRx_Old = 0
End If
.Cells(tempRow, 8) = MaintRx_Old
If DetectCat >= 2 And DetectCat < 5 Then
MaintRx_New = 1
NumMaint_New_temp = NumMaint_New_temp + 1
Else
MaintRx_New = 0
End If
.Cells(tempRow, 10) = MaintRx_New
'Continue on to next mission?
If SuccessMsn = 0 Then
.Cells(tempRow, 11) = "Baseline Offline until PM"
flagX = True
End If
If SuccessMsn2 = 0 Then
.Cells(tempRow, 11) = "Sys w/ISHM Offline until PM"
flagY = True
End If
If flagX = True And flagY = True Then
k = NumMissions + 1
End If
If DetectCat = 5 Or TrueCat = 5 Then
k = NumMissions + 1
j = MaintNum + 1
.Cells(tempRow, 11) = "Catastrophic Failure"
End If
Next k
tempRow2 = Range("A13").End(xlDown).Offset(1).Row
.Cells(tempRow2, 1) = "End of Preventative Maintenance Cycle"
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'Update Metrics
NumFalseAlarms = NumFalseAlarms + NumFalseAlarms_temp
NumFaultsDetected = NumFaultsDetected + NumFaultsDetected_temp
NumFaults = NumFaults + NumFaults_temp
NumIncorrectDeclared = NumIncDecl_temp + NumIncorrectDeclared
NumSuccessMsns_Old = NumSuccessMsns_Old +
NumSuccessMsns_Old_temp
NumMaint_Old = NumMaint_Old + NumMaint_Old_temp
NumSuccessMsns_New = NumSuccessMsns_New +
NumSuccessMsns_New_temp
NumMaint_New = NumMaint_New + NumMaint_New_temp
Next j
tempRow3 = Range("A13").End(xlDown).Offset(1).Row
.Cells(tempRow3, 1) = "End of Vehicle Lifetime"
Results(i, 1) = NumSuccessMsns_Old
Results(i, 2) = NumMaint_Old
Results(i, 3) = NumSuccessMsns_New
Results(i, 4) = NumMaint_New
Results(i, 5) = NumFaults
Results(i, 6) = NumFaultsDetected
Results(i, 7) = NumFalseAlarms
Results(i, 8) = NumIncorrectDeclared
Next i
End With
'Output Results
Worksheets("Results").Activate
With Worksheets("Results")
Application.Goto .Range("A1:J30")
For i = 1 To MonteCarloNum
.Cells(11 + i, 2) = i
.Cells(11 + i, 3) = NumMissions * MaintNum
For j = 1 To 8
.Cells(11 + i, 3 + j) = Results(i, j)
SumTotal(j) = SumTotal(j) + Results(i, j)
Next j
Next i
.Cells(2, 5) = MonteCarloNum * NumMissions * MaintNum
.Cells(3, 5) = SumTotal(1)
.Cells(4, 5) = SumTotal(2)
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.Cells(5, 5) = SumTotal(3)
.Cells(6, 5) = SumTotal(4)
End With
End Sub
Function InputCheck() As Boolean
flagInput = True
'Check combobox has selections
If UserForm1.SystemDist.Value = "" Then
MsgBox "You have not selected a distribution. Please select a distribution and "
&_
"run the Monte Carlo simulation again", , "Error"
flagInput = False
Exit Function
End If
'Check Parameter inputs are valid numbers
If IsNumeric(UserForm1.SysParam1.Value) = False Or
IsNumeric(UserForm1.SysParam2.Value) = False Then
MsgBox "You have either entered a non-numeric value for the system
parameters" & _
" or left a field blank. Please enter a numeric value and run the Monte Carlo
simulation again", , "Error"
flagInput = False
Exit Function
End If
'Turn parameter inputs into numbers
SysParam1 = CDec(UserForm1.SysParam1)
SysParam2 = CDec(UserForm1.SysParam2)
'Check that all numbers are positive
If SysParam1 < 0 Or SysParam2 < 0 Then
MsgBox "You have entered in a negative number, all numbers should be
positive", , "Error"
flagInput = False
Exit Function
End If
'Check Failure Properities are valid numbers
If IsNumeric(UserForm1.SysCat1.Value) = False Or
IsNumeric(UserForm1.SysCat2.Value) = False _
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Or IsNumeric(UserForm1.SysCat3.Value) = False Or
IsNumeric(UserForm1.SysCat4.Value) = False _
Or IsNumeric(UserForm1.SysCat5.Value) = False Then
MsgBox "You have entered a non-numeric value for a probability of a failure
mode occurance or have" & _
" left a field blank. Please enter a numeric value and run the Monte Carlo
simulation again", , "Error"
flagInput = False
Exit Function
End If
'Turn failure inputs into numbers
SysCat1 = CDec(UserForm1.SysCat1)
SysCat2 = CDec(UserForm1.SysCat2) + SysCat1
SysCat3 = CDec(UserForm1.SysCat3) + SysCat2
SysCat4 = CDec(UserForm1.SysCat4) + SysCat3
SysCat5 = CDec(UserForm1.SysCat5) + SysCat4
'Check Failure Properties are between 0 and 1
If UserForm1.SysCat1.Value < 0 Or UserForm1.SysCat1.Value > 1 Or
UserForm1.SysCat2.Value < 0 Or UserForm1.SysCat2.Value > 1 _
Or UserForm1.SysCat3.Value < 0 Or UserForm1.SysCat3.Value > 1 Or
UserForm1.SysCat4.Value < 0 Or UserForm1.SysCat4.Value > 1 _
Or UserForm1.SysCat5.Value < 0 Or UserForm1.SysCat5.Value > 1 Then
MsgBox "You have entered a failure propability greater than 1 or less than 0."
&_
" Please enter a correct probability and run the Monte Carlo simulation
again", , "Error"
flagInput = False
Exit Function
End If
'Check Failure Properties sum to 1 for each system
If SysCat5 <> 1 Then
MsgBox "The failure properties do not total 1. Please enter a correct probability
and run the Monte Carlo simulation again", , "Error"
flagInput = False
Exit Function
End If
'Check ISHM Properities are valid numbers
If IsNumeric(UserForm1.ProbDetect.Value) = False Or
IsNumeric(UserForm1.ProbFalseAlarm.Value) = False Or
IsNumeric(UserForm1.ProbDiagnostic.Value) = False Then
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MsgBox "You have entered a non-numeric value for an ISHM property or left a
field blank. Please enter a numeric value and run the Monte Carlo simulation
again", , "Error"
flagInput = False
Exit Function
End If
'Check ISHM Properties are between 0 and 1
If UserForm1.ProbDetect.Value < 0 Or UserForm1.ProbFalseAlarm.Value < 0 Or
UserForm1.ProbDiagnostic.Value < 0 _
Or UserForm1.ProbDetect.Value > 1 Or UserForm1.ProbFalseAlarm.Value
> 1 Or UserForm1.ProbDiagnostic.Value > 1 Then
MsgBox "You have entered a failure propability greater than 1 or less than 0
for an ISHM property" & _
" or left a field blank. Please enter a correct probability and run the Monte
Carlo simulation again", , "Error"
flagInput = False
Exit Function
End If
'Turn ISHM inputs into numbers
ProbDetect = CDec(UserForm1.ProbDetect)
ProbAlarm = CDec(UserForm1.ProbFalseAlarm)
ProbDiagnostic = CDec(UserForm1.ProbDiagnostic)
'Check Monte Carlo inputs are numerical
If IsNumeric(UserForm1.MonteCarloNum.Value) = False Or
IsNumeric(UserForm1.AverageMissionLength.Value) = False _
Or IsNumeric(UserForm1.MaintLength.Value) = False Or
IsNumeric(UserForm1.Lifetime.Value) = False Then
MsgBox "You have either entered a non-numeric value or left a field blank in
the Monte Carlo frame. " & _
"Please enter a numeric value.", , "Error"
flagInput = False
Exit Function
End If
'Check that inputs are within max and min or positive
If UserForm1.MonteCarloNum.Value < 0 Or
UserForm1.AverageMissionLength.Value < 0 Or UserForm1.Lifetime.Value < 0
_
Or UserForm1.MonteCarloNum.Value > 500 Or
UserForm1.MaintLength.Value < 0 Then
MsgBox "You have entered a negative number or a number out of range for
Monte Carlo Simulations. " & _
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"Please enter a valid number.", , "Error"
flagInput = False
Exit Function
End If
'Turn Monte Carlo Inputs into numbers
MonteCarloNum = CDec(UserForm1.MonteCarloNum)
MissionLength = CDec(UserForm1.AverageMissionLength)
MaintLength = CDec(UserForm1.MaintLength)
Lifetime = CDec(UserForm1.Lifetime)
NumMissions = Int(MaintLength / MissionLength) 'Rounds down
InputCheck = flagInput
End Function
Sub ActivateStartPage()
Worksheets("Intro").Activate
End Sub
Sub ViewAssumptions()
Worksheets("Assumptions").Activate
Application.Goto Worksheets("Assumptions").Range("A1:N30")
ActiveWindow.Zoom = True
Worksheets("Assumptions").Cells(1, 1).Select
End Sub
Sub SetUpConfusionMatrix()
'Assumption that any ISHM diagnostic algorithm will be within one category of
the true category
With Worksheets("ConfusionMatrix")
.Cells(2, 6) = ProbDiagnostic
'Nominal Column
.Cells(8, 3) = ProbDiagnostic
.Cells(9, 3) = 1 - ProbDiagnostic
.Cells(10, 3) = 0
.Cells(11, 3) = 0
.Cells(12, 3) = 0
.Cells(13, 3) = 0
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'Cat 1 Column
.Cells(8, 4) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2
.Cells(9, 4) = ProbDiagnostic
.Cells(10, 4) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2
.Cells(11, 4) = 0
.Cells(12, 4) = 0
.Cells(13, 4) = 0
'Cat 2 Column
.Cells(8, 5) = 0
.Cells(9, 5) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2
.Cells(10, 5) = ProbDiagnostic
.Cells(11, 5) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2
.Cells(12, 5) = 0
.Cells(13, 5) = 0
'Cat 3 Column
.Cells(8, 6) = 0
.Cells(9, 6) = 0
.Cells(10, 6) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2
.Cells(11, 6) = ProbDiagnostic
.Cells(12, 6) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2
.Cells(13, 6) = 0
'Cat 4 Column
.Cells(8, 7) = 0
.Cells(9, 7) = 0
.Cells(10, 7) = 0
.Cells(11, 7) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2
.Cells(12, 7) = ProbDiagnostic
.Cells(13, 7) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2
'Cat 5 Column
.Cells(8, 8) = 0
.Cells(9, 8) = 0
.Cells(10, 8) = 0
.Cells(11, 8) = 0
.Cells(12, 8) = 1 - ProbDiagnostic
.Cells(13, 8) = ProbDiagnostic
End With
End Sub
Sub ReadConfusionMatrix()
Dim Temp(6) As Double
flag = True
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With Worksheets("ConfusionMatrix")
'Input Check
For j = 1 To 6
Temp(j) = .Cells(15, 2 + j).Value
If Temp(j) <> 1 Then
MsgBox "The columns need to add to 1, please reset this matrix", , "Error"
flag = False
j=7
End If
Next j
End With
If flag = False Then
Exit Sub
Else
With Worksheets("HiddenCM")
For i = 1 To 6
For j = 1 To 6
ConfMatrix(i, j) = .Cells(7 + i, 2 + j).Value
Next j
Next i
End With
Call MonteCarloSim(True)
End If
End Sub
Function DeclareMatrix(RandCat As Double, TrueCat As Single, Detect As Single)
If Detect = 0 Then
DeclareMatrix = 0
Exit Function
End If
If TrueCat = 0 Then
For i = 0 To 5
If RandCat < ConfMatrix(i + 1, 1) Then
DeclareMatrix = i
i=6
End If
Next i
ElseIf TrueCat = 1 Then
For i = 0 To 5
If RandCat < ConfMatrix(i + 1, 2) Then
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DeclareMatrix = i
i=6
End If
Next i
ElseIf TrueCat = 2 Then
For i = 0 To 5
If RandCat < ConfMatrix(i + 1, 3) Then
DeclareMatrix = i
i=6
End If
Next i
ElseIf TrueCat = 3 Then
For i = 0 To 5
If RandCat < ConfMatrix(i + 1, 4) Then
DeclareMatrix = i
i=6
End If
Next i
ElseIf TrueCat = 4 Then
For i = 0 To 5
If RandCat < ConfMatrix(i + 1, 5) Then
DeclareMatrix = i
i=6
End If
Next i
Else
For i = 0 To 5
If RandCat < ConfMatrix(i + 1, 6) Then
DeclareMatrix = i
i=6
End If
Next i
End If
End Function
Sub ClearWorkbook()
With Worksheets("Calculations")
.Cells(4, 2).ClearContents
.Cells(5, 2).ClearContents
.Cells(6, 2).ClearContents
.Cells(4, 5).ClearContents
.Cells(5, 5).ClearContents
.Cells(6, 5).ClearContents
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.Cells(7, 5).ClearContents
.Cells(8, 5).ClearContents
.Cells(3, 11).ClearContents
.Cells(4, 11).ClearContents
.Cells(5, 11).ClearContents
.Cells(6, 11).ClearContents
.Cells(7, 11).ClearContents
.Cells(3, 14).ClearContents
.Cells(4, 14).ClearContents
.Cells(5, 14).ClearContents
.Cells(6, 14).ClearContents
.Cells(4, 16).ClearContents
.Cells(4, 17).ClearContents
.Cells(8, 16).ClearContents
.Cells(8, 17).ClearContents
.Range("a15:" &
.Range("a15").End(xlDown).End(xlToRight).Address).ClearContents
.Range("g15:" &
.Range("g15").End(xlDown).End(xlToRight).Address).ClearContents
End With
With Worksheets("ConfusionMatrix")
.Cells(2, 6).ClearContents
.Range("c8:" &
.Range("c8").End(xlDown).End(xlToRight).Address).ClearContents
End With
With Worksheets("Results")
.Range("E2:" & .Range("E2").End(xlDown).Address).ClearContents
.Range("b12:" &
.Range("b12").End(xlDown).End(xlToRight).Address).ClearContents
End With
Unload UserForm1
Worksheets("Intro").Activate
End Sub
Sub ViewCalcPage()
Worksheets("Calculations").Activate
End Sub
Sub ViewResults()
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Worksheets("Results").Activate
End Sub
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Appendix D: Design of Experiments Results and Models

Alias Structure with Main Effects and Low Order Interactions
A = Weibull-Theta
B = Weibull-Beta
C = Sensor Quality (c)
D = Probability of Detection (PD)
E = P(Fault Category II)
F = P(Fault Category III)
G = ISHM Diagnostic Confidence Level (DCL)
I = ABD = ACE = BCF = ABCG
A = A + BD + CE + FG
B = B + AD + CF + EG
C = C +AE + BF + DG

D = D + AB + CG + EF
E = E + AC + BG + DF
F = F + BC + AG + DE
G = G + CD + BE + AF

Initial Experiment Results
The initial experiment results can be found below. The original run order was random;
however, this data has been sorted to place the center points at the bottom for easier
analysis.
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Run
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Response
33
21
514
368
526
97
22
613
82
98
382
487
414
144
30
166
85
23
195
330
821
50
25
309
109
126
21
11

Weibull theta
-1
-1
-1
1
1
-1
1
1
-1
-1
-1
1
1
-1
1
1
-1
-1
-1
1
1
-1
1
1
0
0
0
0

Weibull beta
-1
1
-1
1
1
1
-1
-1
-1
1
-1
1
1
1
-1
-1
-1
1
-1
1
1
1
-1
-1
0
0
0
0

Sensor Quality
1
1
-1
1
-1
-1
1
-1
1
1
-1
1
-1
-1
1
-1
1
1
-1
1
-1
-1
1
-1
0
0
0
0

Prob
Detection
1
-1
1
1
1
-1
-1
-1
1
-1
1
1
1
-1
-1
-1
1
-1
1
1
1
-1
-1
-1
0
0
0
0
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Prob Fault
Category II
-1
-1
1
1
-1
1
1
-1
-1
-1
1
1
-1
1
1
-1
-1
-1
1
1
-1
1
1
-1
0
0
0
0

Prob Fault
Category III
1
-1
-1
-1
1
1
1
-1
1
-1
-1
-1
1
1
1
-1
1
-1
-1
-1
1
1
1
-1
0
0
0
0

Diagnostic CL
-1
1
1
-1
1
-1
1
-1
-1
1
1
-1
1
-1
1
-1
-1
1
1
-1
1
-1
1
-1
0
0
0
0

The response for each run is the total of the four repeated measurements, as seen below:

RM - 1 RM - 2 RM - 3 RM - 4 Response
2
6
0
25
33
0
2
15
4
21
13
324
53
124
514
0
49
148
171
368
213
169
100
44
526
10
3
1
83
97
15
5
2
0
22
242
10
69
292
613
21
60
1
0
82
3
23
1
71
98
92
124
11
155
382
45
1
344
97
487
44
163
51
156
414
1
27
108
8
144
5
9
13
3
30
29
0
17
120
166
10
26
2
47
85
2
8
4
9
23
0
50
106
39
195
213
109
2
6
330
149
222
94
356
821
36
6
2
6
50
13
4
7
1
25
45
91
90
83
309
6
3
4
96
109
48
16
8
54
126
13
1
0
7
21
3
3
1
4
11

Initial Model Analysis
Using these results, the sum of squares for the factors and their interactions were
calculated and it was found that Weibull-Theta, Sensor Quality, and PD were significant.
Due to aliasing, the sum of squares for PD also includes the interaction between WeibullTheta and Weibull-Beta; however, since Weibull-Beta is not significant to the model, it
can be assumed that PD is the true significant factor.
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Regressing these factors against the test data gave a fairly high coefficient of
determination (R2) value of 0.704 and an F0 value of 13.67 (p-value of less than 0.0001),
as seen below. These values signified that the model explained most of the variability in
the data, and further exploration of the individual factors confirmed that they all still
significantly contributed to the model.

Examination of the model residuals did not indicate any normality assumptions were
violated (no apparent pattern or significant tailing in the variance checks). The Residual
by Predicted Plot and the Normal Quantile Plot can be seen below.

Variability of the non-significant factors was also investigated, with the following
settings to be determined as causing less variance in the results.
Factor
Weibull - Beta
P(Fault Category II)
P(Fault Category III)
DCL

Best Setting for
Variability
Either
High – 0.4
Either
Either

The Center Points that were chosen indicated that curvature is present, as seen by a pvalue under 0.05 below. This means the assumption of linearity in the factor effects
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cannot be maintained and axial points need to be added for further analysis. Curvature
can be investigated through a central composite design.

Central Composite Model
Axial points were then added to the test design to further explore the response surface.
For a 3-factor experiment, an axial point of 30.25 (0.316) will be used to ensure the design
is fully rotatable. The new test design settings in natural units can be seen in the table
below. The remaining test factors will be kept at their low settings except for P(Fault
Category II), which will be kept high. The axial points will be tested in random order
with two replications for a total of 18 additional test points and will be added the previous
test results for re-analysis.
Factor
Weibull-Theta
Sensor Quality
PD

Axial (-1.316)
652
36.8
0.21

The second experiment results can be seen below:
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Axial (1.316)
1047
563
0.99

Response
460
143
847
106
1186
63
197
55
586
0
824
33
64
167
776
5
1498
40

Weibull theta
1.316
-1.316
0
0
0
0
1.316
-1.316
0
0
0
0
1.316
-1.316
0
0
0
0

Weibull beta
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1

Sensor Quality
0
0
0
0
1.316
-1.316
0
0
0
0
1.316
-1.316
0
0
0
0
1.316
-1.316

Prob
Detection
0
0
1.316
-1.316
0
0
0
0
1.316
-1.316
0
0
0
0
1.316
-1.316
0
0

Prob Fault
Category II
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Prob Fault
Category III
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1

Diagnostic CL
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1

As expected from the results of the curvature analysis, a second-order response surface
was discovered. There were also some low-order interactions and a main effect (P(Fault
Category III)) that were found to be newly significant. However, there is clear funneling
in the residuals, indicating that a transformation of the response variable is necessary.

Since the funneling is consistent with a Poisson random variable (the variance of y is
proportional to the regressor), a transformation of y to
is appropriate. With this
transformation, the residuals retained a scatter pattern and did not indicate any normality
assumptions were violated. The new Residual by Predicted Plot and the Normal Quantile
Plot can be seen below.
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The final coded parameter estimates and significant factors and interactions can be seen
below:

Regressing these factors against the test data gave a higher coefficient of determination
(R2) value of 0.81 and an F0 value of 16.73 (p-value of less than 0.0001) than the initial
model, as seen below. This new model also gives a significantly smaller Mean Square
Error, another indication that this model is a better fit to the data than the initial model.

The final model equation mapping the response surface in natural values is seen below:
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From this equation the stationary point is a point of minimum response, clearly visible in
the figure below.

While this response surface best illustrates the region were the response is at its
minimum, or the region where adding ISHM to the UAS baseline would not significantly
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affect mission success rates, there can be some inferences made about the regions that
maximize the response. By determining the sensor properties significant and not the only
ISHM performance characteristic (the Diagnostic Confidence Level), this evaluation
implies that the benefits or disadvantages of adding ISHM rely primarily on the
performance of the baseline health management system. Specifically, that ISHM becomes
more beneficial as the baseline health management system performs worse.
Based on these results, when evaluating whether to add ISHM to a vehicle, decision
makers should compare the cost and mission benefits of upgrading just the sensors with
the cost and mission benefits of adding ISHM. The two options have roughly equivalent
installation labor costs, as each would have to be implemented at the subsystem level (the
difference being replacing the sensors versus adding a module to an existing sensor), so
the main comparison would be the cost of the new sensors versus the cost of the ISHM
technology weighed against the difference in expected mission success rates.
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